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Abstract
This paper studies the potential eﬀects of vertical integration on downstream firms’
incentives to innovate. Interacting eﬃciently with a supplier may require information
exchanges, which raises the concern that sensitive information may be disclosed to
rivals. This may be particularly harmful in case of innovative activities, as it increases
the risk of imitation. We show that vertical integration exacerbates this threat of
imitation, which de facto degrades the integrated supplier’s ability to interact with
unintegrated competitors. Vertical integration may thus lead to input foreclosure,
thereby raising rivals’ cost and limiting both upstream competition and downstream
innovation. A similar concern of customer foreclosure arises in the case of downstream
bottlenecks.
Jel Codes: L13, L41, L42.
Keywords: Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, Innovation, Imitation, Firewall.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate whether vertical integration may trigger input foreclosure
through a risk of information leakage and imitation. Eﬃciency reasons may require
firms to exchange sensitive information with their suppliers, which raises the concern
that this information can then be disclosed to rivals.1 Vertical integration exacerbates
this concern, since an integrated supplier can be more tempted to pass on such in-
formation to its downstream subsidiary. This issue is particularly serious in the case
of innovative activities, as it creates a risk of imitation and thus tends to make the
integrated supplier less reliable when dealing with downstream rivals. In other words,
vertical integration may result in input foreclosure, not because the integrated firm
will refuse to supply unaﬃliated rivals but simply because it becomes less reliable.2
As a result, vertical integration strengthens the market power of alternative suppliers,
thereby “raising rivals’ costs” and impeding innovation.3
This issue is a growing concern for the European Commission, who mentions for
example in its recent Guidelines on the assessment of non horizontal mergers: “The
merged entity may, by vertically integrating, gain access to commercially sensitive
information regarding the upstream or downstream activities of rivals. For instance,
by becoming the supplier of a downstream competitor, a company may obtain critical
information, which allows it to price less aggressively in the downstream market to the
detriment of consumers. It may also put competitors at a competitive disadvantage,
thereby dissuading them to enter or expand in the market.”4 This issue has also been
raised in a number of merger cases.5
1Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) show for instance that such concerns impact the choice of firms
with respect to their investment banks, as firms appear reluctant to use the same investment bank
as their direct competitors.
2While we focus here on input foreclosure, brand manufacturers voice similar concerns in con-
nection with the development of private labels. As the promotional activities associated with the
launch of new products generally require advance planning with the main retailers, manufacturers
have expressed the fear that this may give these retailers an opportunity to reduce or even eliminate
the lead time before the apparition of “me-too" private labels.
3For an early discussion of “raising rivals’ costs” strategies, see Krattenmaker and Salop (1986).
4Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the
control of concentrations between undertakings adopted by the European Commission on 18.10.2008
(O.J. 2008/C 265/07), at §78.
5Milliou (2004) mentions for example a number of US cases in R&D intensive sectors such as de-
fense, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, satellite and energy. In Europe, the issue was for exam-
ple discussed in such merger cases as Boeing/Hughes (Case COMP/M.1879), Cendant/ Galileo (Case
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A recent European example is the merger between TomTom and Tele Atlas.6 Tom-
Tom manufactures portable navigation devices (or “PNDs”), whereas Tele Atlas was
one of the two main providers of digital map databases for navigation in Europe and
North America. In its decision, the European Commission states that “third parties
have expressed concerns that certain categories of information considered confidential
which they currently pass to Tele Atlas, for instance during technical consultations,
could, after the merger, be shared with TomTom.” This concern was based on the
premise that “Tele Atlas’s customers have to share information on their future com-
petitive actions with their map supplier. [...] In a number of examples provided [...] by
third parties, companies voluntarily passed information about their estimated future
sales, product roadmaps and new features included in the latest version of their de-
vices. They did this for four main reasons, firstly, to negotiate better prices, secondly,
to incorporate existing features in new products, thirdly to encourage the map suppli-
ers to develop new features, and finally, in order to ensure technical interoperability of
new features with the core map and the software.”7 Third parties feared that “[a]ccess
to information about the future behavior of its downstream customers, would allow
the merged firm to preempt any of their actions aimed at winning more customers
(through better prices, innovative features, new business concepts, increased coverage
of map databases). This would in turn reduce the incentive of TomTom’s competitors
to cooperate with Tele Atlas on pricing policy, innovation and new business concepts,
all of which would require exchange of information. This would strengthen the mar-
ket power of NAVTEQ, the only alternative map supplier, with regards to these PND
operators and could lead to increased prices or less innovation”.8
In the US, the FTC recently put conditions on two vertical mergers on the market
for carbonated soft drinks. In February 2010, PepsiCo acquired its two largest bottlers
COMP/M.2510), Gess/Unison (Case COMP/M.2738) and EDP/ENL/GDP (Case COMP/M.3440).
6Case No COMP/M.4854 - TOMTOM/TELE ATLAS, 14/05/2008.
7Commission decision at § 256.
8Commission decision at § 253. After a thorough examination the Commission finally concluded
that “the confidentiality issues post-merger [were] unlikely to lead to a significant impediment of
eﬀective competition” in that case. The Commission assessed that a foreclosure strategy was unlikely
to be profitable, since the price of the map database represents a very small part of the total
production cost of a PND, and only part of a raise in the map price would be passed on to the
PND’s final price (see e.g. Decision at 216). The Commission felt moreover that the nature of
the information exchanged between Tele Atlas and its customers limited the concerns and that the
firewalls and non-disclosure agreements used by TeleAtlas could credibly be extended to the new
situation. Yet, the detailed discussion of these issues confirms their potential relevance for the case.
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and distributors in North America who were also acting as bottlers and distributors
for its rival Dr Pepper Snapple (henceforth “DPSG”). Yet the FTC expressed his
concern that "PepsiCo will have access to DPSG’s commercially sensitive confiden-
tial marketing and brand plans. Without adequate safeguards, PepsiCo could misuse
that information, leading to anticompetitive conduct that would make DPSG a less
eﬀective competitor[· · ·]".9 The FTC ordered PepsiCo to set up a firewall in order
to regulate the use of this commercially sensitive information.10 The FTC put sim-
ilar conditions on Coca Cola’s acquisition of its largest North American bottler in
september 2010.11
Our analysis supports these concerns. In a simple successive duopoly framework in
which downstream firms must exchange sensitive information with their suppliers in
order to implement innovation, we first show that vertical integration can indeed lead
to foreclosure when it exacerbates a risk of imitation through information leakages.
By making the supplier less “reliable”, vertical integration forces the downstream
competitor to share the value of its innovation with the other supplier; this discourages
the rival’ innovation eﬀorts and expands the merging parties’ market shares and profit
at the expense of independent rivals. We then check that this insight is robust to
various changes in the basic framework and that such strategic motive can make
vertical integration attractive and hurt rivals even if these could in theory “fight
back” and become vertically integrated themselves. Finally, we show that, through
such foreclosure, vertical integration harms consumers and reduces total welfare.
We also discuss several reasons why an integrated firm may indeed be more likely
to pass on sensitive information to its own subsidiary. Vertical integration may for
example make it easier to transmit such information discreetly (or more diﬃcult not
to take advantage of this possibility). It may also enhance coordination between the
upstream and downstream eﬀorts required for successful imitation. But, maybe more
to the point, vertical integration moreover drastically alters the merged entity’s incen-
tives to protect customers’ information; as a result, strategic motives do exacerbate
the risk of imitation. An integrated firm may for example choose to invest in reverse
engineering technology where an independent supplier would not do so. An integrated
firm has also less incentives to build eﬀective firewalls or provide financial guarantees
9See FTC 2010; The FTC was also concerned by the risk of facilitated coordination in the industry.
10See FTC’s decision and order "In the Matter of PepsiCo Inc", case 0910133 of February 26, 2010.
11See FTC’s decision and order "In the Matter of The Coca-Cola Company", case 1010107 of
September 27, 2010.
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that the innovation will not be imitated. We first present these ideas in a static
framework before showing, in a dynamic setting, how vertical integration aﬀects the
merged entity’s incentives to build a reputation of reliability.
Our analysis is first related to the literature on market foreclosure and in partic-
ular to the seminal paper by Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), henceforth referred
to as OSS. They argue that a vertical merger could be profitable as it allows the
integrated firm to raise rivals’ costs, by degrading their access to its own supplier and
increasing in this way the market power of alternative suppliers.12 Salinger (1988)
has obtained the same result in a successive Cournot oligopoly framework where in-
tegrated firms are supposed to exit the intermediate market. As highlighted by Hart
and Tirole (1990) or Reiﬀen (1992), both OSS and Salinger’s analysis rely however
on the assumption that the integrated firm could somehow commit itself to limiting
its supplies to downstream rivals, since otherwise it would have an incentive to keep
competing with the alternative suppliers. By contrast, in our article the integrated
supplier needs not commit itself to refusing to deal with or limiting its supplies to
rivals: by exacerbating the risk of information leakages, a vertical merger de facto
degrades the perceived quality of the integrated supplier, which suﬃces to increase
the market power of the alternative suppliers. Reiﬀen (1992) also mentions that the
analysis of OSS relies on the assumption that suppliers can only charge linear prices
on the intermediate market, otherwise the increased market power of the independent
suppliers need not result into higher, ineﬃcient marginal input prices. In our arti-
cle, even if supply contracts are ex-post eﬃcient (with cost-based marginal prices),
increasing alternative suppliers’ market power adversely aﬀects unintegrated rivals’
R&D incentives.13
Several papers have explored ways to dispense with the commitment assumption.
For example, Gaudet and Long (1996) have shown in a successive Cournot oligopoly
framework that an integrated firm can find profitable to buy some inputs in order
to raise the input price, and thus its downstream rivals’ cost. Ma (1997) shows that
12Hart and Tirole (1990), O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1992) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994) oﬀer a
diﬀerent foreclosure rationale, in which vertical integration allows a bottleneck owner to exert more
fully its market power over independent downstream firms. See Rey and Tirole (2007) for an overview
of that literature.
13Note however that, as long as the integrated firm stops supplying the downstream rival, eﬃcient
contracting (e.g., two-part tariﬀs) among the independent firms need not result into cost-based
marginal input prices, as the rivals could “dampen competition” by maintaining above-cost transfer
prices — see Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Rey and Stiglitz (1995) and Shaﬀer (1991).
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foreclosure obtains without any commitment when the suppliers oﬀer complementary
components of downstream bundles.14 In case of vertical separation, the competitive
downstream industry makes no profit and oﬀers at prices reflecting input costs. In
contrast, when one of the suppliers integrates downstream, it has an incentive to stop
supplying its component to downstream rivals, so as to monopolize the market for the
bundle. Choi and Yi (2000) revisit the commitment issue by showing that an inte-
grated supplier could find profitable to oﬀer an input specifically tailored to the needs
of its downstream unit, rather than a generic input that could be sold to other firms
as well. In a close spirit, Church and Gandal (2000) have shown that a software sup-
plier vertically integrated with a hardware firm could find profitable to stop providing
a software compatible with the rival’s hardware in order to depreciate the latter’s
product. Again foreclosure arises in equilibrium as long as the compatibility decision
is not too easily reversible. Finally, imperfect competition in the upstream market
(combined with input linear prices) could also restore some foreclosure eﬀects even in
the absence of commitment not to supply. Most of the literature on the foreclosure
eﬀect of vertical integration claims that foreclosure stems from the integrated firm’s
incentive to stop supplying (or to limit its supplies to) downstream competitors. Chen
(2001) and Chen and Riordan (2007) stress however that the independent downstream
firm may well favor the integrated supplier, in order to relax downstream competition
(the downstream subsidiary becoming less aggressive as it then internalizes the impact
of its marketing decision on its upstream division business). By contrast, we point
out that foreclosure may arise from the independent downstream firm’s reluctance to
deal with the integrated supplier due to the risk of information leakage.
Our paper is also related to the literature on innovation and product imitation.
Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006) investigate for example the link between the vertical
market structure and the risk of imitation when information can be leaked. In a
framework where a research unit bargains with two competitive development units,
they compare the eﬃciency and R&D incentives generated by alternative modes of
licensing: “open sale” (the usual form of patents) vs. “closed sale” and partial vertical
integration (the licensor then holding a stake in the licensed firm’s post-invention
revenues). Although patenting is socially preferable, when the invention is highly
profitable the parties may instead opt for a “closed sale”, which limits the risk of
14In Ma’s paper, the inputs are diﬀerentiated substitutes, but complementarity arises from uncer-
tainty about consumers’ relative preferences, which leads the downstream firms to oﬀer “bundles”
in the form of option contracts.
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leakage by reducing the incentives for secretly selling the information to downstream
competitors.
Several papers have more specifically studied the impact of firewalls who prohibit
internal transfers of the proprietary information that a subsidiary may receive from
third parties. However, these papers do not analyze the foreclosure issue. For instance,
Hughes and Kao (2001) consider a market structure where an integrated firm and
less eﬃcient upstream rivals compete to supply downstream firms among which one
has private information about the demand. By supplying that firm, the integrated
supplier obtains its private information and shares it with its downstream subsidiary,
which thus becomes more eﬃcient. In spite of this risk of information disclosure,
the informed downstream firm buys from the eﬃcient integrated supplier if the latter
sets a suﬃciently attractive input price. Here the risk of information disclosure leads
to lower equilibrium input prices and a higher welfare. By eliminating the risk of
information disclosure, a firewall would enable the integrated firm to raise its price
towards the cost of its ineﬃcient rival, and lower welfare.
Our paper is also close to Milliou (2004), who studies the impact of a firewall
on downstream firms’ R&D incentives; she considers the case of a pure bottleneck
(the integrated supplier has full control of the intermediate market) and shows that
a firewall enhances rivals’ incentives to innovate but reduces the incentives of the
integrated firm (in the case of complementary R&D paths) or enhances them (in the
case of substitutes). In both cases, the integrated firm innovates more frequently
in the absence of a firewall, however, due to the fact that it then benefits from the
information flow (and the downstream rivals moreover face ineﬃcient input prices).
In contrast, we consider an R&D race in which competitors can turn to an alternative
supplier, and indeed do so in the absence of a firewall; as a result, the integrated firm
never actually benefits from any information flow and the adoption of a firewall would
therefore not aﬀect its behavior in the race for innovation (that is, its “best response”
is not aﬀected — the actual R&D eﬀort however adapts to the change in rivals’ R&D
eﬀorts). It follows that information flows always reduce the overall intensity of R&D.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple R&D model in
which the risk of information leakages and imitation is treated as exogenous; we first
use this model to show how vertical integration results in foreclosure, before providing
robustness checks and discussing welfare implications. Section 3 discusses several
reasons, most notably strategic ones, why vertical integration can indeed increase the
threat of imitation. Section 4 explores more formally a reputation argument in the
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context of a dynamic model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Foreclosure through the risk of imitation
We develop in this section a very simple model capturing the main intuitions. Our
working assumption here is that, contrary to independent suppliers, an integrated
supplier will always make use of any confidential information it can obtain from its
customers in order to try and imitate their innovation. We show that this creates an
incentive for vertical mergers, motivated by input foreclosure, and analyze the welfare
consequences. As mentioned, we show in the next sections how this working assump-
tion can be validated in contexts where both integrated and independent suppliers
choose whether to disclose customers’ sensitive information.
2.1 Framework
Two upstream firms UA and UB supply a homogenous input to two downstream firms
D1 and D2, which transform it into a final good and compete for customers. Unit
costs are supposed to be constant and symmetric at both upstream and downstream
levels, and are normalized to 0; we moreover assume that technical constraints impose
single sourcing. Upstream competition for exclusive deals then leads the suppliers to
oﬀer eﬃcient contracts, which boils down to supply any desired quantity in exchange
for some lump-sum tariﬀ T .15
Downstream firms may innovate, which increases the value of the final good they
oﬀer. When one firm innovates, its comparative advantage generates an additional
profit ∆ > 0. However, when both firms innovate, competition dissipates part of this
profit and each firm then obtains δ < ∆/2.16 Normalizing to zero the profits achieved
15Since suppliers compete here for exclusive deals, whether the contract terms are public or secret
does not aﬀect the analysis: in both instances, each supplier will have an incentive to propose an
eﬃcient contract, in which the marginal transfer price reflects the marginal cost (normalized here to
0).
16Suppose for instance that the innovation allows a downstream firm to create a new good or to
address a new market segment. If only one firm innovates, it obtains the corresponding monopoly
profit, πM ; if instead both firms innovate, then they share a lower duopoly profit πD < πM . We
then have ∆ = πM and δ = πD/2 < ∆/2. Consider for example a Cournot duopoly with linear
demand P (Q) = d − Q, in which innovation reduces the unit cost c from d (so that the market is
barely viable) to 0; a firm that does not innovate obtains zero profit, while the monopoly profit is
πM = d2/4 and the duopoly profit is πD = 2d2/9 < πM .
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in the absence of innovation, the payoﬀ matrix is thus as follows, where I and N
respectively denote “Innovation”and “No innovation”:
D1\D2 I N
I δ, δ ∆, 0
N 0,∆ 0, 0
(1)
Each Di decides how much to invest in innovation. More precisely, we suppose
that Di can innovate with probability ρi by investing an amount C (ρi) — we will refer
to ρi as Di’s R&D eﬀort. We will adopt the following regularity conditions:
Assumption A (unique, stable and interior innovation equilibrium).
The cost function C (.) is twice diﬀerentiable, convex and satisfies:
• A(i) C 00 (.) > ∆− δ;
• A(ii) 0 ≤ C 0 (0) ≤ δ;
• A(iii) C 0 (1) > ∆.
A(i) ensures that best responses are well behaved; A(ii) and A(iii)moreover imply
that equilibrium probabilities of innovation strictly lie between 0 and 1.
In the absence of any vertical integration, the competition game is as follows:
• In stage 1, D1 and D2 simultaneously choose their R&D eﬀorts and then in-
novate with probabilities ρ1 and ρ2; the success or failure of their innovation
eﬀorts is observed by all firms.
• In stage 2, UA and UB simultaneously oﬀer lump-sum tariﬀs to each downstream
firm; we will denote by Thi the tariﬀ oﬀered by Uh to Di (for h = A,B and
i = 1, 2); each Di then chooses its supplier.
We also consider a variant of this game in which UA is vertically integrated with
D1. Throughout this section, we assume that this vertical integration creates a risk
for D2 to see its innovation imitated by D1 if it chooses UA for supplier: in that case,
with probability θ > 0 the integrated firm successfully mimics the innovation (at no
cost).
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2.2 Vertical separation
Since the two suppliers produce the same input with the same constant unit cost, in
the second stage Bertrand-type competition yields TAi = TBi = 0. In the first stage,
each Di chooses its R&D eﬀort ρi so as to maximize its expected profit, which is given
by:
πi = Π
¡
ρi, ρj
¢
≡ ρi
¡
ρjδ +
¡
1− ρj
¢
∆
¢
− C (ρi) . (2)
It follows that R&D eﬀorts are strategic substitutes:
∂2Πi
∂ρi∂ρj
= − (∆− δ) < 0. (3)
Let ρi = R
¡
ρj
¢
denote Di’s best response to ρj ∈ [0, 1] (by construction, these best
responses are symmetric); Assumption A ensures that it is uniquely characterized by
the first-order condition:
C 0 (ρi) = ρjδ +
¡
1− ρj
¢
∆, (4)
and that it yields a unique equilibrium,17 which is symmetric, interior and stable:18
Lemma 1 In case of vertical separation, under Assumption A the best response R (ρ)
is diﬀerentiable and satisfies:
0 ≤ R (ρ) < 1, (5)
where the first inequality is strict whenever ρ < 1, and:
−1 < R0 (ρ) < 0. (6)
As a result there exists a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric and such that (where
the superscript V S refers to Vertical Separation):
0 < ρV S1 = ρ
V S
2 = ρ
∗ < 1. (7)
Proof. The convexity assumption, together with the boundary conditions A (ii)
and A (iii), ensures that the best response to ρj ∈ [0, 1], ρi = R
¡
ρj
¢
, is uniquely
17We assume that fixed costs, if any, are small enough to ensure that expected profits are always
positive (assuming C (0) = 0 would ensure that this is always the case) and thus that entry and exit
considerations are not an issue.
18That is, the slope of the best responses is lower than 1 in absolute value.
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characterized by the first-order condition (4) and satisfies (5), withR (ρ) > 0 whenever
ρ < 1. Diﬀerentiating the first-order condition yields:
R0 (ρ) =
− (∆− δ)
C 00 (R (ρ))
< 0.
We thus have: (i) R0 (ρ) < 0, (ii) R (0) > 0, and (iii) R (1) < 1. These properties
imply that there is a unique value ρ∗, which moreover lies strictly between 0 and
1, such that ρ∗ = R (ρ∗). By construction, ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ
∗ constitutes a symmetric
equilibrium. Conversely, condition A (i) implies R0 (ρ) > −1, which in turn implies
that this equilibrium is stable and that there is no other equilibrium.
2.3 Vertical integration
Suppose now that UA and D1 merge, and denote by UA−D1 the resulting integrated
firm. In the second stage of the game, the two suppliers are again equally eﬀec-
tive when either D2 does not innovate, or both D1 and D2 innovate; in both cases,
Bertrand-like competition among the suppliers leads them to oﬀer cost-based tariﬀs
to D2. When instead D2 is the sole innovator, dealing with the integrated supplier
exposes D2 to see its innovation imitated with probability θ > 0. Thus, while D2’s
expected gross profit is again ∆ if it buys from UB, it is only θδ+ (1− θ)∆ if it buys
from UA −D1; UA is however willing to oﬀer a discount equal to the expected value
from imitation, θδ. This asymmetric competition leads UA to oﬀer TA2 = −θδ and UB
to win19 with TB2 = θ (∆− 2δ), which gives D2 a net profit:
θδ + (1− θ)∆− TA2 = ∆− TB2 = ∆− θ (∆− 2δ) .
In the first stage, D2’s expected profit is now given by:
π2 = Πθ (ρ2, ρ1) ≡ ρ2 (ρ1δ + (1− ρ1) (∆− θ (∆− 2δ)))− C (ρ2) , (8)
whereas the integrated firm UA −D1’s expected profit is as before equal to:
πA1 = π1 = Π (ρ1, ρ2) , (9)
where Π (., .), given by (2), coincides with Πθ (., .) only for θ = 0. Best responses are
thus respectively given by ρ1 = R (ρ2) and ρ2 = Rθ (ρ1), characterized by:
C 0 (ρ2) = ρ1δ + (1− ρ1) (∆− θ (∆− 2δ)) . (10)
19Note that, contrary to Chen (2001) and Chen and Riordan (2007), upstream tariﬀs do not
influence here the intensity of downstream competition; the risk of opportunistic behavior then
insures that in equilibrium D2 always favors UB .
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Rθ (.) coincides with R (.) for θ = 0 and is identically equal to zero when θ = 1 and
δ = 0. Furthermore, for ρ < 1, Rθ (ρ) strictly decreases as θ increases. As a result:
Lemma 2 In case of vertical integration, under Assumption A there exists a unique,
stable equilibrium, in which R&D eﬀorts are asymmetric for any θ > 0 and of the
form (where the superscript V I refers to Vertical Integration):
ρV I1 = ρ
+
θ , ρ
V I
2 = ρ
−
θ , (11)
where ρ+0 = ρ
−
0 = ρ
∗, and ρ+θ and ρ
−
θ respectively increase and decrease as θ increases
from 0 to 1.
Proof. In the polar case (θ = 1, δ = 0), D2 never invests in R&D since: (i) if
both firms innovate, competition entirely dissipates their profits; and (ii) if only D2
innovates, the threat of imitation by the integrated firm allows UB to extract the full
value of the innovation. As a result, the integrated firm behaves as a monopolist and
invests ρ1 = ρ
m ≡ R (0).
Suppose now that θ < 1 and/or δ > 0. The convexity assumption, together with
the boundary conditions A (ii) and A (iii), ensures that D2’s best response to ρ1 ∈
[0, 1], Rθ (ρ1), is uniquely characterized by the first-order condition (10) and satisfies:
0 ≤ Rθ (ρ) < 1,
with Rθ (ρ) > 0 whenever ρ < 1. Diﬀerentiating (10) yields:
R0θ (ρ) = −
∆− δ − θ (∆− 2δ)
C 00 (Rθ (ρ))
< 0. (12)
It thus satisfies again Rθ (1) < 1, Rθ (0) > 0, R0θ (0) < 0, and (using condition A (i))
R0θ (ρ) > −1. The same reasoning as above thus implies the existence of a unique,
stable equilibrium, in which the R&D eﬀorts satisfy ρ+θ = R
¡
ρ−θ
¢
and ρ−θ = Rθ
¡
ρ+θ
¢
.
Clearly, ρ+0 = ρ
−
0 = ρ
∗ since R0 (.) coincides with R (.). Finally, diﬀerentiating the
first-order conditions (4) and (10) with respect to ρ+θ , ρ
−
θ and θ yields:
dρ+θ
dθ
=
¡
1− ρ+θ
¢
(∆− δ) (∆− 2δ)
C 00
¡
ρ+θ
¢
C 00
¡
ρ−θ
¢
− (∆− δ) (∆− δ − θ (∆− 2δ))
> 0, (13)
since assumptionA (i) implies that the denominator is positive, whereas A (iii) implies
that the numerator, too, is positive (i.e., ρ+θ < 1); similarly:
dρ−θ
dθ
=
−
¡
1− ρ+θ
¢
C 00
¡
ρ+θ
¢
(∆− 2δ)
C 00
¡
ρ+θ
¢
C 00
¡
ρ−θ
¢
− (∆− δ) (∆− δ − θ (∆− 2δ))
< 0. (14)
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2.4 The foreclosure eﬀect of vertical integration
Note first that vertical integration would have no impact here in the absence of R&D
investments: with or without integration, both input providers would oﬀer to supply at
marginal cost. In contrast, when innovation matters, then whenever integration creates
a risk of imitation (θ > 0) it de facto reduces the “quality” of the integrated supplier
for the independent competitor, leaving it in the hands of the remaining, independent
supplier. This “input foreclosure” enhances the independent supplier’s market power,
thereby raising the cost of supply for the downstream rival, who must share with the
supplier the benefit of its R&D eﬀort. This discourages the independent firm from
investing in R&D, which in turn induces the integrated subsidiary to increase its own
investment. The quality gap, and thus the foreclosure eﬀect, increases with the risk of
imitation θ. As long as this risk remains limited (θ < 1 and/or δ > 0), the integrated
supplier still exerts a competitive pressure on the upstream market. As a result, the
independent downstream competitor retains part of the value of its innovation and
thus remains somewhat active on the innovation market (“partial foreclosure”). In
contrast, when the imitation concern is maximal (θ = 1 and δ = 0), the integrated
supplier provides no value for the independent firm; the independent supplier can
then extract the full benefit of any innovation by the independent firm, which thus no
longer invests in R&D. The integrated firm then de facto monopolizes the innovation
market segment (“complete foreclosure”).
Formally, a comparison of the investment levels with and without integration
yields:
Proposition 3 Compared with the case of vertical separation, a vertical merger be-
tween UA and D1 replicates the eﬀect of input foreclosure:
(i) it leads the independent firm D2 to invest less, and the integrated subsidiary
to invest more in innovation — all the more so as the probability of imitation, θ,
increases; in particular, when vertical integration triggers imitation with certainty
(θ = 1) and competition fully dissipates profits (δ = 0), the integrated firm monopolizes
the innovation market.
(ii) it increases the joint profit of the merging parties, UA and D1, at the expense
of the downstream independent rival D2; while the independent supplier UB benefits
from its enhanced market power over D2, the joint profit of the independent firms also
decreases.
Proof. Part (i) follows from the fact that ρ−θ and ρ
+
θ respectively decrease and
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increase as θ increases, and that they both coincide with ρ∗ for θ = 0, whereas ρ−θ = 0
for θ = 1 and δ = 0. As for part (ii), it suﬃces to note that ρ−θ < ρ
∗ < ρ+θ implies:
πV IA1 = π
+
θ ≡ maxρ1
Π
¡
ρ1, ρ
−
θ
¢
> π∗ ≡ max
ρ1
Π (ρ1, ρ
∗) = πV S1 = π
V S
A + π
V S
1 ,
and:
πV IB + π
V I
2 = Π
¡
ρ−θ , ρ
+
θ
¢
< max
ρ2
Π
¡
ρ2, ρ
+
θ
¢
< max
ρ2
Π (ρ2, ρ
∗) = πV S2 = π
V S
B + π
V S
2 ,
where the first inequality stems from the fact that ρ−θ is chosen byD2 so as to maximize
its own profit, Πθ
¡
ρ2, ρ
+
θ
¢
, rather than the joint profit Π
¡
ρ2, ρ
+
θ
¢
of the independent
firms. Since πV IB ≥ πV SB = 0, the the last inequality also implies πV I2 > πV S2 .
Note that imitation never occurs in equilibrium, since the independent downstream
competitor always ends up dealing with the independent supplier. Yet, the threat of
imitation suﬃces to increase the independent supplier’s market power at the expense
of the independent downstream firm, who reduces its innovation eﬀort.
This input foreclosure eﬀect benefits the integrated firm, UA−D1, who faces a less
aggressive rival. Due to strategic substitution, the integrated firm moreover responds
by increasing its investments which not only further degrades D2’s profit but also
degrades the joint profits of the independent firms.20
2.5 Robustness
This analysis is robust to various changes in the modeling assumptions.
Information leakages. The analysis still applies for example when information flows
already exist in the absence of any merger, as long as vertical integration increases
these flows and the resulting probability of imitation, e.g., from θ to θ. The distortion
term θ (2∆− δ) then simply becomes
¡
θ − θ
¢
(2∆− δ).
Bilateral bargaining power. The same logic applies when downstream firms have
significant bargaining power in their bilateral negotiations with the suppliers, as long
as suppliers obtain a positive share of the specific gains generated by the relationship.
20The joint profit of UB and D2 is furthermore impaired by coordination failure in D2’s investment
decision (that is, ρ− < R (ρ+)). Also, while UB always benefits here from foreclosure (since it obtains
no profit in the benchmark case of vertical separation), in more general contexts, foreclosure may
have an ambiguous impact on UB, who obtains a larger share of a smaller pie. In contrast, in the
OSS foreclosure scenario, the profit of the independent suppliers as well as the joint profit of the
independent rivals can increase, since the integrated firm raises its price in the downstream market.
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Suppose for example that suppliers obtain a share λ < 1 of these specific gains from
trade. This does not aﬀect the outcome in case of vertical separation, since both
suppliers are equally eﬀective in that case: there is thus no specific gain to be shared
and downstream firms still obtain the full benefit of their innovation; R&D eﬀorts are
therefore again given by ρV S1 = ρ
V S
2 = ρ
∗. In contrast, in case of vertical integration
the independent supplier obtains a share λ of its comparative advantage over the
integrated rival whenever D2 is the only innovator (that is, TB2 = λθ (∆− 2δ) in that
case); D2’s expected profit thus becomes:
π2 = Πλθ (ρ2, ρ1) ≡ ρ2 (ρ1δ + (1− ρ1) (∆− λθ (∆− 2δ)))− C (ρ2) . (15)
The same analysis then applies, replacing the probability θ with the “adjusted proba-
bility” λθ, which now depends on the relative bargaining power of the supplier as well
as on the risk of imitation. As long as λ > 0, innovation eﬀorts are again distorted
compared with the case of vertical separation.
Imperfect imitation. In practice, an imitator may not be as eﬀective a competitor
as a genuine innovator; the imitator may for example lag behind the innovator, who
can moreover take steps to protect further its comparative advantage. Yet, the analysis
applies as long as imitation reduces the value of the innovation by L, say. In case of
vertical integration, whenever D2 is the sole innovator the independent supplier can
still charge a positive markup reflecting its comparative advantage, TB2 = θL > 0.
Imperfect competition in the downstream market. When both firms innovate, limit-
ing factors such as product diﬀerentiation, capacity constraints, competition in quan-
tities rather than prices, and so forth, may limit competition and thus increase the
resulting profit δ. This increases the incentives to invest in R&D (since an innovator
obtains more profit when the rival innovates as well) and attenuates the foreclosure
eﬀect, both because imitation is less costly and because the integrated supplier is
willing to oﬀer a larger discount, reflecting the increased value from duplication, and
thus exerts a tougher pressure on the alternative supplier. Yet, our analysis shows
that partial foreclosure still arises as long as imitation reduces total industry profit
(that is, as long as ∆ > 2δ).
Imperfect competition in the upstream market. The above reasoning carries over to
the case where suppliers produce imperfect substitutes, as long as vertical integration
renders the integrated supplier less reliable for the independent downstream firms.
Suppose for example that each downstream firm has a favored supplier: D1 (resp. D2)
obtains an additional surplus γ when dealing with UA (resp. UB), say. If UA and D1
14
vertically integrate, andD2 is the sole innovator, UA is then less attractive than before.
It oﬀers D2 a subsidy TA2 = −θδ, reflecting the expected gain from imitation, but UB
now wins the competition for D2 with an even higher tariﬀ, TB2 = θ (∆+ γ − 2δ).
Conversely, if UA were D2’s favored supplier, UB would still be able to extract a
positive rent from D2’s innovation as long as the comparative advantage does not
oﬀset reliability concerns (i.e., as long as γ < ∆ − 2δ). The foreclosure eﬀect is
however stronger when a downstream firm merges with its own favored supplier.21
Number of competitors. It should be clear that the analysis does not rely criti-
cally on the restriction to duopolies. If for example there were additional stand-alone
downstream firms, vertical integration would enhance the market power of the inde-
pendent supplier over these other firms as well, thus discouraging their R&D eﬀorts
to the benefit of the integrated firm. Likewise, the argument still applies when there
are more than two suppliers, as long as upstream competition remains imperfect, so
that degrading the perceived quality of the integrated supplier enhances the market
power of the others over the independent downstream firms.
Timing of negotiations. We assumed so far that negotiations take place only once
an innovation materializes (ex post contracting). This makes sense, for example,
when it is diﬃcult to specify ex ante the exact nature of the innovation. The same
analysis however applies when negotiations take place earlier on, as long as R&D
eﬀorts are observed beforehand. The suppliers then still oﬀer cost-based tariﬀs in
case of vertical separation; and in case of integration, the independent supplier again
imposes a tariﬀ reflecting its (expected) comparative advantage over the integrated
supplier, TB2 = θ(1−ρ1)ρ2∆, and this has exactly the same impact on D2’s incentives
to invest in R&D.
Both timings thus result in creating a “hold-up” eﬀect on a downstream firm’s
investment, and vertical integration then generates foreclosure by exacerbating this
hold-up problem. If instead suppliers could commit themselves before downstream
firms take their investment decisions, they could avoid hold-up problems, and fore-
closure would no longer arise. Suppose for example that firms can agree on lump-sum
payments, not contingent on the success of innovation eﬀorts. While vertical integra-
tion might still increase the market power of independent suppliers, and thus their
tariﬀs, this would no longer translate into lower investments, and thus the foreclosure
eﬀect would disappear. Such arrangements however raise several concerns. Liquidity
constraints may for example call for deferred payments, which in turn triggers credi-
21A formal derivation is presented at the end of Appendix C.
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bility issues, particularly when downstream firms have limited access to credit. To see
this, suppose that downstream firms are initially cash constrained, and have moreover
no access to credit. Downstream firms must therefore pay their suppliers out of real-
ized profits. The best contracts then boil down to milestone payments, conditional
upon the success or failure of (both) innovation eﬀorts. Consider for example the case
where δ = 0 and θ = 1. With ex post contracting there is then complete foreclosure:
since UB would fully appropriate the benefit from innovation, D2 does not invest —
and UB thus obtains zero profit. With ex ante contracting, UB can instead commit
itself to not appropriating the full value of innovation. Yet, since D2’s payment can
only come out of its innovation profit, UB’s market power still reduces investment in-
centives. To see this, let T denote D2’s payment in case it is the sole innovator; D2’s
expected profit becomes ρ2 (1− ρ1) (∆− T ) and the resulting investment levels are
of the form (ρ1(T ), ρ2(T )), where ρ1 (.) and ρ2 (.) respectively increase and decrease
with T , and ρ2 (∆) = 0. Ex ante, UB then sets T so as to maximize its expected
profit, πB(T ) = ρ2 (T ) (1− ρ1 (T ))T . The optimal tariﬀ then satisfies T ∗ < ∆, as it
takes into consideration the negative impact of T on the probability of D2 being the
sole innovator, ρ2 (T ) (1− ρ1 (T )); UB and D2 thus both obtain a positive profit even
when δ = 0 and θ = 1. More generally, ex ante contracting is more eﬃcient than ex
post contracting whenever T ∗ < θ (∆− 2δ). Yet, the hold-up problem remains, even
if to a more limited extent, and foreclosure still arises.
Customer foreclosure. The analysis can also be readily transposed to the case
where upstreammanufacturers need to exchange information with their distributors in
order to launch new products. Vertical integration, as in the case oh the acquisition of
downstream bottlers and wholesalers by PepsiCo or CocaCola’s, or the development of
private labels by large retail chain, may there again exacerbates the risk of information
leaks and discourage manufacturer’s innovation.22
Suppose for example that: (i) upstream, two manufacturers UA and UB create a
new product with probabilities ρA and ρB by investing C (ρA) and C (ρB); (ii) when
a manufacturer innovates, it can choose either D1 or D2 to launch and distribute the
new product; and (iii) a successful launch requires early communication of confidential
information about the characteristics and new features of the product, which facili-
22In a recent market study, DIW reports that new national brand products are imitated more
quickly by private labels (average delay of 10, 9 month) than by other national brands (12, 3 months).
Similar observations applies for packaging imitation (Zunehmende Nachfragemacht des Einzelhan-
dels, Eine Studie fur den Markenverband (DIW Econ)).
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tates the development of “me-too” substitutes. Concerns about information leaks then
militate for relying on a single distributor, in which case the situation is essentially
the same as the one studied above. Consider the following competition game, which
mirrors the previous one:
• In stage 1, UA and UB simultaneously choose their R&D eﬀorts and then in-
novate with probabilities ρA and ρB; the success or failure of their innovation
eﬀorts is observed by all firms.
• In stage 2, D1 and D2 simultaneously oﬀer lump-sum tariﬀs to each manufac-
turer, who then chooses its distributor (on an exclusive dealing basis).
Adopting similar cost and profit conditions as above, this competition game yields
again a symmetric outcome of the form ρA = ρB = ρ
∗ in case of vertical separation, and
an asymmetric outcome reflecting a foreclosure eﬀect, of the form ρA = ρ
+
θ > ρB = ρ
−
θ ,
when for example UA merges with D1. As a result, vertical integration increases the
profit of the merging parties, at the expense here of the independent manufacturer.
Manufacturers have often voiced such type of concern in reaction to the growing
development of private labels by large retailers.
Productivity investments, expansion projects and business strategies. Finally, while
we have focused on risky innovation projects, our analysis applies as well to less
uncertain productivity gains, development plans, capacity investments, and so forth,
that enhance firms’ competitiveness but require prior communication and information
exchanges with upstream or downstream partners. Suppose for example that:
• Downstream competition depends on firms’ “eﬀective capacities”, δ1 and δ2:
each Di obtains Cournot-like profits of the form π (δi, δj) ≡ P (δ1+ δ2)δi, where
the “inverse demand function” satisfies P 0 (.) < 0 and P 0 (δ) + P 00 (δ) δ < 0,
which in particular ensures the concavity of the joint profit function.23
• Each δi depends on Di’s investment decision, ρi, but also requires the coopera-
tion from Di’s supplier: thus, δi = ρi in the case of vertical separation, whereas
if UA and D1 are vertically integrated, then δ2 = ρ2 but δ1 = ρ1 + θiρ2, where
i = A,B denotes D2’s supplier choice, and θA = θ > θB = 0; that is, D1 benefits
from D2’s investment if D2 deals with UA.
23The second order derivative of the joint profit function is 2P 0 (δ)+P 00 (δ), which is indeed negative
under these assumptions.
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• The timing is as follows: first, the downstream firms make their capacity invest-
ment decisions, ρ1 and ρ2 (for simplicity, the costs of these decisions are born
ex post and are embodied in the function P (.)); second, UA and UB compete
for the development of Di’s eﬀective capacity; third, downstream competition
yields the above-described profits.
When both suppliers are independent, upstream competition leads them to supply
at cost; thus, each Di chooses ρi so as to maximize π(ρi, ρj) = P
¡
ρi + ρj
¢
ρi, which
yields:
P (ρ1 + ρ2) + P
0 (ρ1 + ρ2) ρi = 0. (16)
The above regularity conditions then imply that capacity decisions are strategic sub-
stitutes (i.e., Di’s best response decreases when ρj increases) and that there is a
unique, stable symmetric equilibrium ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ
∗.24
When instead UA and D1 are vertically integrated, then UA is willing to oﬀer a
subsidy of up to π (ρ1 + θρ2, ρ2)− π (ρ1, ρ2), which would give D2 a profit equal to:
π2 (ρ2, ρ1; θ) ≡ π (ρ2, ρ1 + θρ2) + π (ρ1 + θρ2, ρ2)− π (ρ1, ρ2)
= P (ρ1 + (1 + θ) ρ2) (ρ1 + (1 + θ) ρ2)− P (ρ1 + ρ2) ρ1.
As long as total capacity ρ1 + ρ2 exceeds the monopoly level (implying that total
profit, P (ρ1 + ρ2) (ρ1 + ρ2), decreases with any further increase in either investment),
π2 (ρ2, ρ1; θ) remains lower than π (ρ2, ρ1) = P (ρ1 + ρ2) ρ2, and thus UB wins the
competition at a price that leaves D2 with exactly π2 (ρ2, ρ1; θ). Conversely, D2’s
buying from UB leads UA −D1 to maximize as before π(ρ1, ρ2) = P (ρ1, ρ2) ρ1; thus,
its behavior remains characterized by the first order condition (16), which in turn
implies that ρ1 + ρ2 indeed exceeds the monopoly level.
25 By contrast, maximizing
π2 (ρ2, ρ1; θ) rather than π2 (ρ2, ρ1) = π2 (ρ2, ρ1; 0) leads D2 to limit its investment,
24The slope of Di’s best response is equal to
∂ρri
∂ρj
= − P
0 (ρ1 + ρ2) + P 00 (ρ1 + ρ2) ρi
2P 0 (ρ1 + ρ2) + P 00 (ρ1 + ρ2) ρi
,
and thus lies between −1 and 0 when P 0 (ρ) + P 00 (ρ) ρ < 0 and P 0 (ρ) < 0.
25The monopoly level, ρM , is defined by P
¡
ρM
¢
+ P 0
¡
ρM
¢
ρM = 0, whereas P 0 < 0 and (16)
imply: P (ρ1 + ρ2) + P
0 (ρ1 + ρ2) (ρ1 + ρ2) < P (ρ1 + ρ2) + P 0 (ρ1 + ρ2) ρ1 = 0; from the concavity
of the joint profit function, we thus have ρ1 + ρ2 > ρ
M .
18
since:
∂2θρ2π2 (ρ2, ρ1; θ) = [P (ρ1 + (1 + θ) ρ2) + P
0 (ρ1 + (1 + θ) ρ2) (ρ1 + (1 + θ) ρ2)]
+ (1 + θ)2 [2P 0 (ρ1 + (1 + θ) ρ2) + P
00 (ρ1 + (1 + θ) ρ2) (ρ1 + (1 + θ) ρ2)] ,
where the first term is negative because the total quantity ρ1 + (1 + θ)ρ2 exceeds the
monopoly level (ρ1+ (1+ θ)ρ2 > ρ1+ ρ2 > ρ
M) and the second term is negative from
the concavity of the joint profit function. Therefore, in equilibrium D2 invests less
than in case of vertical separation, which benefitsD1 (as it faces a less aggressive rival)
and makes vertical integration profitable — in addition, since investments are strategic
substitutes, D1 invests more than in the separation case, which reduces independent
rivals’ joint profit.26
2.6 Rivals’ counter-fighting strategies
Since input foreclosure increases the profit of the merging firms at the expense of their
rivals, it may encourage these rivals to merge as well. Indeed, the situation with two
vertical mergers is similar to the initial, no-merger situation, since there is again no
risk of imitation: the two integrated suppliers supply at cost their subsidiaries, which
will thus invest ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ
∗. Since each integrated firm then obtains Π∗, in the
absence of any specific cost of integration the rivals would have an incentive to merge
in response to a first vertical merger.
Note however that the two situations (with zero or two mergers) would be diﬀerent
if there were any remaining independent downstream competitor. In case of vertical
separation, the two suppliers would then sell at cost to all downstream firms, result-
ing in a level-playing field competition in the downstream market. To be sure, a first
vertical merger between, say, UA and D1, may encourage a second merger between UB
and, say, D2. But while the two suppliers would again sell at cost to all downstream
26For example, for a linear “demand” P (ρ) = 1− ρ, the equilibrium capacities are:
ρ2 =
1
3 + 2t
< ρ∗ =
1
3
< ρ1 =
1 + t
3 + 2t
,
where t = 3θ + 2θ2 > 0, and total capacity indeed satisfies:
ρ1 + ρ2 =
2 + t
3 + 2t
> ρM =
1
2
.
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firms, they would become less reliable for the independent ones; downstream compe-
tition would therefore be biased in favor of the integrated firms, who would still enjoy
a reliable access to the upstream market. Such integration wave would thus confer a
strategic advantage to the merging parties to the detriment of the independent rivals,
who would again decrease their R&D eﬀorts.27
But even in our duopoly model, a first merger can be profitable when integration
is costly, in such a way that the initial merger does not lead the rivals to integrate;
letting K denote the cost of integration, this will be the case when:
K ≡ π∗ −
¡
πV IB + π
V I
2
¢
< K < K ≡ πV IA1 − π∗. (17)
The interval
£
K,K
¤
is empty when πV IA1 + π
V I
B + π
V I
2 < 2π
∗, i.e., when a merger
decreases total industry profit. In that case, a vertical merger either is unprofitable or
triggers a counter-merger that eliminates any strategic advantage for the first merging
firms. Otherwise, we have:
Proposition 4 When partial integration raises total industry profit, there exists a
non-empty range
£
K,K
¤
such that, whenever the integration cost K lies in this range,
the remaining independent firms have no incentive to merge in response to a first
vertical merger; as a result, the first merger creates a foreclosure eﬀect that confers a
strategic advantage to the merging firms, at the expense of the independent downstream
rival.
The scope for counter-fighting strategies thus depends on the impact of partial
integration on industry profits, which itself is ambiguous. To see this, consider the
following benchmark case, in which duplication dissipates profit and R&D costs follow
a standard quadratic specification:
Assumption B:
δ = 0, C (ρ) =
k
2
ρ2.
Assumption A then boils down to:
η ≡ k
∆
> 1.
We have:
27This discussion applies for example to the TomTom/TeleAtlas and Nokia/Navteq mergers dis-
cussed in the introduction.
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Proposition 5 Under assumption B, partial vertical integration raises total industry
profit when and only when innovation is not too costly (η < ηˇ ≡ 1 +
√
2) or the risk
of imitation is not too large (θ < θˇ (η), where θˇ (η) < 1 for η > ηˇ).
Proof. Straightforward computations yield:
• In case of vertical separation:
ρV S1 = ρ
V S
2 = ρ
∗ =
1
1 + η
, (18)
πV S1 = π
V S
2 = π
∗ =
k
2
µ
1
1 + η
¶2
. (19)
• In case of vertical integration between UA and D1:
ρV S1 = ρ
+
θ =
η − (1− θ)
η2 − (1− θ) , ρ
V S
2 = ρ
−
θ =
(1− θ) (η − 1)
η2 − (1− θ) , (20)
πV IA1 =
k (ρ+)2
2
=
k
2
µ
η − (1− θ)
η2 − (1− θ)
¶2
, πV IB + π
V I
2 =
k
2
¡
1− θ2
¢µ η − 1
η2 − (1− θ)
¶2
.
It can then be checked that partial vertical integration always increases total in-
dustry profit when η < ηˇ = 1+
√
2; when instead η ≥ ηˇ, vertical integration increases
total industry profit if and only if θ < θˇ (η) ≡ 2(η−1)2(η+1)
(η2−3)η2−2(η−1) , where θˇ (η) ∈ [0, 1] and
θˇ
0
(η) < 0.
To understand the impact of vertical integration on total industry profit, it is
useful to consider what would be the optimal R&D eﬀorts for the downstream firms
if they could coordinate their investment decisions (but still compete in prices).28
When innovation eﬀorts are inexpensive (namely, η < 2), the firms would actually
find it optimal to have one firm (and only one) invest 1η
¡
> 1
2
¢
, so as to avoid the
competition that arises when both firms innovate. If instead innovation eﬀorts are
expensive (η ≥ 2), the decreasing returns to scale make it optimal to have both firms
invest 1η+2 < ρ
∗. Compared with this benchmark, in the absence of integration,
downstream competition leads the firms to overinvest in innovation, since each firm
neglects the negative externality that its investment exerts on the rival’s expected
profit. Consider now the case of partial integration and for the sake of exposition, let
us focus on the polar case of complete foreclosure θ = 1. Vertical integration then
28These R&D eﬀorts thus maximize a joint profit equal to: (ρ1(1−ρ2)+ρ2(1−ρ1))∆−kρ21/2−kρ22/2.
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de facto implements the integrated industry optimum when η < 2. When instead
innovation eﬀorts are expensive, i.e. η is large, the resulting asymmetric investment
levels and the underlying decreasing returns to scale reduce industry joint profits.
From proposition 4, a vertical merger then generates a profitable foreclosure eﬀect
without triggering a counter-merger.
2.7 Welfare analysis
We first study here the impact of vertical integration on investment levels and on the
probability of innovation,
( ≡ 1− (1− ρ1) (1− ρ2) = ρ1 + ρ2 − ρ1ρ2,
before considering its impact on consumer surplus and total welfare.
Proposition 6 Partial vertical integration reduces total investment; it also reduces
the probability of innovation when θ is not too large, but can increase it for larger values
of θ. For example, under Assumption B it decreases the probability of innovation if
and only if innovation is very costly (η ≥ ηˆ, where η > 1) or when the risk of imitation
is not too large (θ < θˆ (η), where θˆ (η) < 1 for η < ηˆ).
Proof. By construction, the probability of innovation is (θ ≡ ρ+θ +ρ−θ −ρ+θ ρ−θ in the
case of partial integration and (∗ ≡ (0 in the case of separation. Under Assumption
A, total investment decreases when θ increases:
d(ρ−θ + ρ
+
θ )
dθ
=
¡
1− ρ+θ
¢ ¡
∆− δ − C 00
¡
ρ+θ
¢¢
(∆− 2δ)
C 00
¡
ρ+θ
¢
C 00
¡
ρ−θ
¢
− (∆− δ) (∆− δ − θ (∆− 2δ))
< 0,
since from A (i) the denominator is positive, and given A (iii) (which yields ρ+ < 1),
the numerator, too, is positive. However, the probability that both firms innovate
also decreases with θ:
d(ρ−θ ρ
+
θ )
dθ
=
¡
ρ−θ (∆− δ)− ρ+θ C 00
¡
ρ+θ
¢¢ ¡
1− ρ+θ
¢
(∆− 2δ)
C 00
¡
ρ+θ
¢
C 00
¡
ρ−θ
¢
− (∆− δ) (∆− δ − θ (∆− 2δ))
< 0.
The overall eﬀect on the probability of innovation is therefore:
d(θ
dθ
=
¡¡
1− ρ−θ
¢
(∆− δ)−
¡
1− ρ+θ
¢
C 00
¡
ρ+θ
¢¢ ¡
1− ρ+θ
¢
(∆− 2δ)
C 00
¡
ρ+θ
¢
C 00
¡
ρ−θ
¢
− (∆− δ) (∆− δ − θ (∆− 2δ))
.
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This expression is negative for small values of θ since, for θ = 0, ρ+ = ρ− = ρ∗ and
thus:
d(θ
dθ
¯¯¯¯
θ=0
=
(∆− δ − C 00 (ρ∗)) (1− ρ∗)2 (∆− 2δ)
C 00 (ρ∗)C 00 (ρ∗)− (∆− δ) (∆− δ − θ (∆− 2δ)) < 0.
It then follows that, for low values of θ, partial integration decreases the probability
of innovation (that is, (θ < (
∗ = (0).
For larger values of θ, however, the impact may be positive. Indeed, under Assump-
tion B straightforward computations yield d(θ/dθ < 0 as long as θ < θ¯ (η) ≡ (η−1)2,
where θ¯ (η) is positive and increases with η in the relevant range η > 1; in contrast,
d(θ/dθ > 0 when θ > θ¯ (η). As a result, partial integration reduces the overall prob-
ability of innovation if and only if θ < θˆ (η) ≡ (η2 − 1) (η − 1), where θˆ (η) is strictly
higher than θ¯ (η), θˆ
0
(η) > 0, and θˆ (η) < 1 as long as η < ηˆ = 1+
√
5
2
.
An increase in the risk of imitation θ reduces the investment of the independent
firm. Under A(i), this direct negative eﬀect always dominates the indirect positive
eﬀect on the investments of its rival; therefore total investment decreases. As for the
eﬀect on the probability of innovation, the impact of an increase in θ can be written
as (
0
= (1− ρ1) ρ
0
2 + (1− ρ2) ρ
0
1; that is, a change in innovation of one firm only
aﬀects the probability of innovation when the other firm fails to innovate. When the
two firms invest to a similar extent (e.g., when θ is close to zero), the eﬀect of an
increase in θ on the probability of innovation is similar to the impact on the sum
of investments. When instead, the vertically integrated firm invests much more in
R&D than its independent rival, the eﬀect of an increase in θ on the probability of
innovation is mainly driven by its positive (indirect) eﬀect on the integrated firm’s
eﬀort.
In order to study the impact of vertical integration on consumers and welfare, we
need to specify the impact of duplication on consumers. For the sake of exposition,
let us interpret our model as follows:
• the downstream firms initially produce the same good at the same cost c, and
face an inelastic demand of mass M as long as their prices does not exceed
consumers’ valuation v;
• innovation allows the firms to produce a better product, which increases the net
value v − c by ∆/M .
Absent innovation, Bertrand competition yields zero profit. If instead one firm
innovates, it can appropriate the full added value generated by the new product and
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thus obtains ∆. In contrast, when both firms innovate, Bertrand competition leads
the firms to pass on the added value ∆ to consumers, and thus δ = 0. The (expected)
consumer surplus S and total welfare W are then:
S ≡ ρ1ρ2∆,
W ≡ (ρ1 + ρ2 − ρ1ρ2)∆− C (ρ1)− C (ρ2) .
As shown in the proof of proposition 6, vertical integration always reduces the
probability that both firms innovate simultaneously, and thus unambiguously reduces
expected consumer surplus. For the quadratic cost specification, it can further be
checked that vertical integration reduces total welfare:
Proposition 7 Suppose that firms serve initially an inelastic demand with the same
good, and that innovation uniformly increases consumers’ willingness to pay by some
fixed amount; then vertical integration:
(i) always lowers consumer surplus.
(ii) always lowers total welfare when R&D costs are quadratic.
Proof. Part (i) follows from the proof of proposition 6, which shows that the
probability that both firms innovate under partial integration decreases with θ and
coincides for θ = 0 with that obtained with vertical separation.29
For part (ii), it suﬃces to note that vertical integration has no impact on innovation
and welfare when θ = 0 and that, for δ = 0 and C (ρ) = k
2
ρ2, W V Iθ = (ρ
+
θ + ρ
−
θ −
ρ−θ ρ
+
θ )∆− k
ρ+θ
2
2
− k ρ
−
θ
2
2
satisfies dW
V I
θ
dθ = −
(η−1)3η(η−1+θ)
(η2+θ−1)3 < 0.
The framework developed in this section is, of course, restrictive and the scope
of the welfare analysis is thus limited. Vertical integration may also create welfare-
enhancing eﬀects that would appear in a more general framework. For instance, if
the decision to disclose information is endogenous, a vertically integrated firm might
prefer not to disclose information from its own subsidiary: this protection eﬀect might
increase the investment of the integrated firm, thus increasing the likelihood of inno-
vation and thereby welfare.
29The argument also applies to the case δ > 0, implying that vertical integration reduces consumer
surplus whenever an innovator fully appropriates the added value it generates if the other firm does
not innovate. If for example consumers have heterogenous reservation prices — so that demand is
elastic — this is the case when the innovation uniformly increases these reservation prices.
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3 Does vertical integration raise the threat of im-
itation?
To reflect concerns voiced in certain markets, in the previous section we postulated
that vertical integration exogenously creates a risk of information leakage and im-
itation. We now relax this assumption and allow suppliers, integrated or not, to
decide whether to exploit their customers’ information. Indeed, since such informa-
tion would be valuable to downstream competitors, even independent suppliers may
choose to “sell”30 it to (some of) these competitors. As we will show, vertical inte-
gration drastically aﬀects the ability of the firms, as well as their incentives,31 to do
so.
First, vertical integration may facilitate information flows between the upstream
and downstream units of the integrated firm — and may make it easier to keep such
information flows secret. For example, the merged entity may wish to integrate their
IT networks, which may not only facilitate information exchanges but also make it
more diﬃcult to maintain credible firewalls. As a result, an integrated supplier may be
unable to commit itself not to disclose any business secret even when an independent
supplier could achieve that.
Second, an integrated firm may be more successful in coordinating the upstream
and downstream eﬀorts required to exploit rivals’ information. Suppose for exam-
ple that the probability of successful imitation is equal to θUθD, where θU and θD
are unobservable and respectively controlled by the upstream and downstream firms.
Suppose further that each θi can take two values, θ and θ > θ, and that opting for the
low value θ yields a private, non-transferable benefit b, whereas successful imitation
gives the downstream firm the monetary profit δ. It is then easier for an integrated
firm to align upstream and downstream incentives in order to achieve the highest
probability of successful imitation, θθ; as a result, vertical integration can indeed
increase the likelihood of imitation. More precisely:
30The “price”can take several forms: a higher input price, the extension of the customer’s contract,
the introduction of exclusive dealing or quota provisions, and so forth.
31The recent battle between Google and Apple illustrates this concern. Google and Apple initially
cooperated to bring Google’s search and mapping services to Apple’s iPhone. However, following
Google’s entry into the mobile market, with products similar to the iPhone, Apple started a legal
fight in 2010, claiming that HTC, a Taiwanese maker of mobile phones which use Google’s Android
operating system, violates iPhone patents.
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Proposition 8 If θ < δ
2b(θ−θ)
≤ θ + θ, only vertical integration allows the firms to
achieve the maximal probability of successful imitation.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Third, while independent suppliers have incentives to maintain a good reputa-
tion, the incentives of integrated suppliers are drastically altered by strategic con-
siderations, since entertaining the fear of information leakage and imitation yields
foreclosure benefits. To see this, in what follows we compare the outcome of partial
vertical integration to the outcome that prevails in a vertically separated industry,
and consider several ways in which a supplier can aﬀect the risk of information leak-
age and imitation: it may for example exacerbate this risk by investing in costly
reverse-engineering technology, or attenuate it by oﬀering guarantees, e.g. in the form
of firewalls or compensations in case of information leakage.
We present here the main arguments in a simple way, by assuming that in a
preliminary stage, suppliers publicly choose to be “reliable” or not. We thus consider
the following type of game:
• In stage 0, both suppliers, vertically integrated or not, decide whether to be
reliable (which option is more costly depends on the context, e.g., reverse engi-
neering versus guarantees; more on this below).
• In stage 1,D1 andD2 simultaneously choose their R&D eﬀorts and then innovate
with probabilities ρ1 and ρ2; the success or failure of their innovation eﬀorts is
observed by all firms.
• In stage 2, UA and UB simultaneously oﬀer lump-sum tariﬀs to each downstream
firm; we will denote by Thi the tariﬀ oﬀered by Uh to Di (for h = A,B and
i = 1, 2); each Di then chooses its supplier. Finally, unreliable suppliers have
the opportunity to sell their customers’ information to unsuccessful downstream
rivals, through a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, in which case the downstream rival is
able to duplicate the imitation with probability θ > 0.
In the next section, we dispense with the commitment assumption (i.e., stage 0)
and show that the same insights apply in a dynamic framework.
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3.1 Reverse engineering
In order to benefit strategically from “unreliability”, a supplier may make irreversible
decisions facilitating imitation, for example by investing in reverse engineering capa-
bility. To capture this possibility, suppose that, in stage 0, each supplier must decide
whether to invest publicly in a reverse engineering technology, which costs F but then
allows to duplicate any innovation with probability θ.
By construction, suppliers who do not invest in reverse engineering capability
cannot disclose their customers’ information. Consider now the case of an unreliable
supplier who did invest in such capability. If the supplier is integrated, it will never
provide internal information to its independent rival, since the gain from doing so
cannot exceed δ, and thus never compensates for the resulting loss in downstream
profit, ∆− δ. In contrast, any supplier (integrated or not) would have an incentive to
sell the information from an unaﬃliated customer since doing so yields a gain δ.
An independent supplier will however never invest in reverse engineering technol-
ogy, as this would put its business at risk. Suppose for example that the rival does
not invest in reverse engineering. Not investing then leads to symmetric competition
and zero profit, whereas investing would cost F without bringing any benefit, since
the rival would win the competition for customers. Suppose instead that the rival
invests, and consider first the competition for independent customers. Investing as
well leads to symmetric competition between equally unreliable suppliers, resulting in
a net loss F , whereas not investing saves that cost and moreover confers a compara-
tive advantage. As for an integrated customer, investing as well is costly and yields a
comparative disadvantage whereas not investing yields symmetric competition.
Therefore, if both suppliers are vertically separated, the only equilibrium is such
that no one invests in reverse engineering. By contrast, an integrated firm might find
it profitable to invest in reverse engineering, in order to benefit from the resulting
foreclosure eﬀect:32
Proposition 9 Independent suppliers never invest in reverse engineering. In con-
trast, as long as the technology is not too costly, an integrated supplier invests in
reverse engineering in order to benefit from input foreclosure.
32The risk of opportunistic behavior highlighted by Hart and Tirole (1990) may also impede
independent suppliers’ ability to exploit the information acquired through reverse engineering (as
they would be tempted to sell the information to all downstream rivals). By contrast, the integrated
supplier dos not face the same risk of opportunistic behavior and would only exploit the information
internally.
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Proof. See Appendix B.
3.2 Guarantees
Suppliers can also provide financial and non-financial guarantees against information
leakages. They can for example oﬀer a financial compensation in case of imitation.
To be eﬀective, such compensation must exceed δ (covering the innovator’s loss in
case of imitation, ∆ − δ, would e.g. be suﬃcient). For example, signing a confiden-
tiality agreement makes the supplier legally liable to some compensation; additional
protection can also be oﬀered, by increasing the amount to be paid and/or expanding
the set of circumstances under which such compensation would be awarded. This may
however expose the firms to potential losses arising from the uncertainty of legal pro-
ceedings, the risk of default, and so forth, and thus raises the associated transaction
costs.
Alternatively, suppliers can provide non-financial guarantees such as “firewalls ”
— internal information barriers designed to ensure that confidential information is not
passed on from one unit to another. This can for example consist in assigning distinct
teams to competing customers, setting-up specific routines and procedures, adopting
compliance programs prohibiting employees’ communication of sensitive information,
and so on.
These guarantees come at a cost, such as legal fees and damages, transaction costs,
or ad hoc organizational choices (e.g., duplication of tasks, internal auditing teams,
...). Firms may choose to provide such costly guarantees in order to enhance their
reputation; our analysis however suggests that integrated suppliers may lack such
incentive.
To explore this issue, consider the same situation as above except that, in stage 0,
the suppliers no longer need to invest in reverse engineering but can instead provide
guarantees at a cost ϕ.33 To avoid equilibrium multiplicity issues, we introduce some
upstream diﬀerentiation along the lines discussed in section 2.5: in case of innovation,
D1 (resp. D2) obtains a small additional surplus γ when dealing with UA (resp. UB).
have:
33ϕ corresponds here to the cost of setting-up and operating the guarantees system. In particular,
in the case of financial guarantees, it does not include the stipulated compensations, since they will
never be actually paid in equilibrium.
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Proposition 10 As long as the benefit from diﬀerentiation γ is not too large and the
cost ϕ is not excessive, it is a dominant strategy for any independent supplier to oﬀer
guarantees, while an integrated supplier oﬀers no guarantee in order to benefit from
foreclosure.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Consider first the case of an independent supplier facing a reliable rival. If it
is unreliable, it obtains a profit (corresponding to its comparative advantage γ) only
when both downstream firms innovate; in contrast, if it is reliable it obtains this profit
whenever its “best customer” innovates. Oﬀering guarantees thus brings a benefit.
When facing instead an unreliable rival, an independent supplier — reliable or not
— obtains its comparative advantage γ whenever its “best customer” innovates. Be-
coming reliable however allows the supplier to earn additional profit when its best
customer is the sole innovator. In the case of an independent rival, superior reliability
may moreover allow the supplier to win the competition even when its rival’s best
customer is the innovator. However, this extra pressure on the rival supplier benefits
its best customer and fosters that customer’s R&D eﬀorts; by strategic substitutabil-
ity, this results into lower R&D eﬀorts by the reliable supplier’s own best customer,
which tends to reduce the supplier’s expected profit. The overall eﬀect on the reliable
supplier’s profit remains positive, however, as long as reliability matters more than the
comparative advantage γ; in that case, it is a dominant strategy to oﬀer guarantees
as long as their cost is not excessive.
Suppose now that the integrated firm UA − D1 competes against a reliable UB.
The integrated firm then supplies its own subsidiary (and protects its innovation from
imitation) but never wins the competition for the independent downstream firm, who
always favors the rival. Therefore, UA −D1’s variable profit is the same, whether or
not it oﬀers guarantees. Oﬀering no guarantee however saves the cost ϕ and moreover
increases UB’s market power over D2, which as before reduces D2’s innovation eﬀort.
Therefore, when facing a reliable rival, the integrated supplier prefers to oﬀer no
guarantee.
Finally, note that focusing on a merger between D1 and its favorite supplier, UA,
is not restrictive since Appendix C shows that D1 is indeed better oﬀ merging with
UA rather than with the other, less favored supplier.
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4 Strategic foreclosure in a dynamic context
We presented so far our analysis in a simple and rather static framework, in which
the suppliers could somehow commit themselves to be able (or unable) to imitate.
In a dynamic setting, however, the same insights apply even in the absence of any
commitment capacity. Whenever imitation creates a profitable foreclosure eﬀect, a
vertically integrated firm has an incentive to exacerbate the threat of imitation and, as
a result, vertical integration drastically aﬀects suppliers’ incentives to appear reliable.
To see this, we now develop a dynamic framework in which suppliers must decide
whether to invest in costly reverse engineering or duplication capability. We first con-
sider the case where investment has long-term eﬀects. By undertaking such investment,
even if it is costly and not observed by customers, and then exploiting its customers’
information, an integrated firm can demonstrate its capability and enjoy the resulting
foreclosure benefits in subsequent periods. We then consider a variant in which, in
each period, the suppliers can exploit their customers’ information (without being ob-
served, but at a cost); this setting, in which suppliers must bear a cost each time they
want to exploit their customers’ information, thus rules out any “pre-commitment”
on behalf of the suppliers. To introduce reputation concerns, we also assume that
suppliers can be of two types, “bad” suppliers having a lower cost of imitation than
“good” ones; we then show that, while independent suppliers would imitate their cus-
tomers’ innovation only when being bad, vertical integration gives good suppliers an
incentive to do so as well, in order to degrade customers’ perceptions and benefit from
the resulting foreclosure eﬀects.
4.1 Reverse engineering with repeated interaction
We start with the framework described in section 3.1, in which suppliers can invest
F > δ to acquire reverse engineering capability, except that investment is no longer
observable; we assume instead that it has long-lasting eﬀects: firms now interact over
two periods and, while the investment can take place at any point of time, once it
is made reverse engineering becomes available in all (current and future) periods. In
addition, duplication, and/or its impact on the innovator’s profit, is observable; thus,
a supplier who exploits its customer’s information in the first period reveals that it is
in a position to do so again in the second period. Finally, all firms maximize the sum
of their expected discounted profits, using the same discount factor β.
Formally, the timing of the game is as follows:
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• First period: t = 1
— In a first stage, the two downstream firms simultaneously choose their in-
vestments, denoted ρ11 and ρ
1
2. Innovation then succeeds or fails accordingly.
— In a second stage, the two upstream firms simultaneously oﬀer fixed price
tariﬀs to each downstream firm, who then selects a supplier. The selected
supplier decides whether to invest in reverse engineering capability:
∗ if it does not invest, the supplier cannot decipher the relevant infor-
mation;
∗ if it invests, or its customer provides the information, the supplier can
sell it (through a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer) to the other downstream firm.
• Second period: t = 2. The same two stages apply, with the caveat that any
supplier who has invested in reverse engineering at t = 1 can decipher at no cost
any customer’s relevant information.
Note first that a supplier who has not invested in reverse engineering in the first
period will not invest in the second. This is true whether the supplier is integrated or
not, and, if it is, whether its customer is aﬃliated or not. The reason is that investing
in the second period costs F , and cannot generate more than the maximum price the
downstream rival is ready to pay for the innovation, i.e. δ < F .
We now study the first period technology choices, starting with the case of vertical
separation.
4.1.1 Vertical separation
In the first period, an independent supplier will not invest in reverse engineering,
as it requires a cost F that cannot be compensated by the additional profits in the
two periods: exploiting the customer’s information in the second period only would
bring less than βδ < F , whereas exploiting the information in the first period (which
makes sense only when one of its customers is the sole innovator) would bring at
most δ < F and degrade the supplier’s reputation, thus wiping out any future profit.
Therefore, if all firms are independent, no supplier ever invests in reverse engineering.
Both suppliers are thus always equally reliable and obtain zero profit in both periods.
The equilibrium outcomes are thus constant over time: in each period t, each Di’s
expected profit from innovation is
31
πii = ρ
t
i
¡
ρtjδ +
¡
1− ρtj
¢
∆
¢
− C
¡
ρti
¢
.
Investment behaviors are thus ρti = R
¡
ρtj
¢
, which yields for both firms and both
periods the same investments and profits as in the static case: ρti = ρ
∗ and πti = π
∗.
4.1.2 Vertical integration
Assume now that UA and D1 have merged, and first consider the second period com-
petition stage. As noted above, the integrated firm protects its own subsidiary even
if it has already invested in reverse engineering, and since the independent UB never
invests in reverse engineering, it thus never exploits any customer’s information. How-
ever, D2’s procurement decision (when being the sole innovator) depends on its beliefs
about the integrated supplier’s ability to exploit its innovation. If D2 believes that UA
did not invest in reverse engineering in the first period (and thus will not invest either
in the second period), then upstream competition remains symmetric, among reliable
suppliers; suppliers thus obtain zero profit in the second period, whereas downstream
firms invest ρ2i = ρ
∗ and obtain π2i = π
∗.
Suppose instead that D2, being the sole innovator, believes that UA previously
invested in reverse engineering. Assuming passive beliefs,34 asymmetric upstream
competition then leads UA to oﬀer a discount −θδ and UB to win with a positive tariﬀ
reflecting its comparative advantage, thus giving D2 the same expected profit as UA’s
oﬀer. The expected profits of the investing firms are therefore: π2A1 = π
2
1 = Π (ρ1, ρ2)
and π22 = Πθ (ρ1, ρ2). A foreclosure eﬀect thus arises and, as a result, in the second
period the investments are ρ21 = ρ
+
θ > ρ
∗ and ρ22 = ρ
−
θ < ρ
∗, and the profits become:
π2A1 = π
V I
A1 > π
∗, π22 = π
V I
2 < π
∗, and πV IB = ρ
−
θ
¡
1− ρ+θ
¢
θ (∆− 2δ) .
Consider now the first period. When both firms innovate, or none of them inno-
vates, upstream competition is symmetric and leads the suppliers to supply at cost.
The two firms obtain δ in the former case and 0 in the latter case, and in both cases
no supplier has an incentive to invest in reverse engineering (UB never invests anyway,
and UA would not be able to demonstrate its capacity to imitate D2’s innovation).
In contrast, UA may be tempted to invest in reverse engineering when selected by a
downstream firm that is the sole innovator; more precisely:
34That is, assuming that D2 does not revise its belief when receiving an out-of-equilibrium oﬀer
in period 2.
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• If the innovator is D1, UA cannot benefit from investing in reverse engineering:
even if it wants to sell its subsidiary’s innovation, it is cheaper to simply obtain
it from D1; therefore, selling the information will not be interpreted as “having
invested in reverse engineering ”, which in turn implies that it is not worth
selling it (it only brings δ and reduces downstream profit by ∆− δ > δ).
• If the innovator is D2, investing in reverse engineering entails a net loss F − θδ
at t = 1, but gives UB extra market power at t = 2 and thus increases the profit
of the integrated firm in the second period by πV IA1 − π∗; therefore, if:
F − θδ < β
¡
πV IA1 − π∗
¢
, (21)
the integrated supplier will invest in reverse engineering if selected by the down-
stream rival.
Thus, under (21), when D2 is the only innovator at t = 1, it will anticipate that
selecting the integrated supplier will lead it to invest in reverse engineering. UB
thus benefits from a comparative advantage over UA; however, UA is willing to oﬀer
a discounted tariﬀ, TˆA, reflecting not only the value from duplication in period 1,
but also the additional profit it would obtain in period 2 if selected in period 1 and
investing in reverse engineering:
TˆA = F − θδ − β
¡
πV IA1 − π∗
¢
< 0.
In contrast, the best tariﬀ that UB is willing to oﬀer, TˆB, takes into account the
additional profit it could achieve in period 2 if its rival, UA, is instead selected in
period 1, and is thus such that:
TˆB = βπV IB > 0.
Finally, UB wins the competition when its best oﬀer dominates:
∆− TˆB + βπ∗ > ∆− θ (∆− δ) + βπV I2 − TˆA,
which amounts to:
θ (∆− 2δ) > β
¡
ΠV I −ΠV S
¢
− F,
where
ΠV I −ΠV S = πV IA1 + πV I2 + πV IB − 2π∗.
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denotes the impact of foreclosure on total industry profit. This condition thus amounts
to saying that the industry loss resulting from duplication in period 1 exceeds the
increase in profit (if any) resulting from foreclosure in period 2 (in particular, it is
satisfied whenever foreclosure reduces industry profit).
Two cases can thus be distinguished. When θ (∆− 2δ) > β
¡
ΠV I −ΠV S
¢
−F , UB
wins the competition with a tariﬀ, TB > TˆB, that leaves D2 (almost) indiﬀerent with
accepting UA’s best tariﬀ, TˆA. The integrated supplier then never invests in reverse
engineering, since it is not selected when D2 is the sole innovator. Therefore, both
investing firms expect a symmetric profit π∗ in period 2, whatever the R&D outcome
in period 1; as a result, R&D incentives are solely driven by the expected profits
obtained in period 1. Foreclosure however arises in that period: when it is the only
successful innovator, UA would invest in reverse engineering if selected, which allows
UB to charge a higher tariﬀ (TB > TˆB > 0).
When instead θ (∆− 2δ) < β
¡
ΠV I −ΠV S
¢
− F , UA wins the competition in pe-
riod 1 (and then invests in reverse engineering) with a tariﬀ that leaves D2 (almost)
indiﬀerent with accepting UB’s best tariﬀ. Compared with the case of vertical sepa-
ration, both downstream firms are less willing to invest. In addition, since UA wins
the competition and invests in reverse engineering, foreclosure arises again in period
2.
The following proposition summarizes this discussion:
Proposition 11 Suppose that (21) holds. Then:35
• when θ (∆− 2δ) > β ¡ΠV I −ΠV S¢ − F , no firm ever invests in reverse engi-
neering but the threat of doing so generates foreclosure in period 1;
• when θ (∆− 2δ) < β ¡ΠV I −ΠV S¢ − F , in period 1 both firms are less willing
to invest in R&D than in the absence of integration, and the integrated firm
moreover invests in reverse engineering when the independent rival is the sole
innovator; foreclosure then arises in period 2.
Foreclosure thus arises (either in period 1 or 2) whenever (21) holds. Repeating
the interaction over T > 2 periods further weakens this condition, which becomes:
F − θδ < 1− β
T
1− β β
¡
πV IA1 − π∗
¢
. (22)
35In the boundary case ∆− 2δ = βφ−F , foreclosure may arise in either the first or both periods.
34
The right-hand side increases in T , which thus relaxes the condition. In particular, if
β is close enough to 1, then condition (22) is always satisfied for T large enough.
4.2 Reputation
In the previous section, investment in reverse engineering was not observable but had
long-lasting eﬀects, which somehow allowed (integrated) suppliers to “commit” them-
selves to being unreliable in future periods. We now consider an alternative situation
in which, in each period, suppliers must invest in order to exploit their customer’s
information in that period. In this context, we show that, even if its investment de-
cisions are unobserved by customers, an integrated supplier has an incentive to build
a reputation of exploiting such information. To this aim, we now assume that, while
some suppliers must spend an amount F > δ in order to exploit a customer’s infor-
mation (e.g., by investing in specific reverse engineering), others can do so at no cost.
We will refer to the former as “good ” types and to the latter as “bad ” types.36 For
the sake of exposition, we assume that only one supplier may be unreliable: UA, say,
is good with probability p and bad with probability 1− p, whereas UB is good with
probability 1.
We extend the two-stage game of section 2.1 by adding a last stage where suppliers,
reliable or not, may choose to sell the information:
• In stage 1,D1 andD2 simultaneously choose their R&D eﬀorts and then innovate
with probabilities ρ1 and ρ2; the success or failure of their innovation eﬀorts is
observed by all firms.
• In stage 2, UA and UB simultaneously oﬀer lump-sum tariﬀs to each independent
downstream firm; we will denote by Thi the tariﬀ oﬀered by Uh to Di (for
h = A,B and i = 1, 2); each Di then chooses its supplier.
• In stage 3, suppliers (at cost F if “good”, at no cost otherwise) can sell a
customer’s information to its unsuccessful downstream rival, through a take-
it-or-leave-it oﬀer, in which case the downstream rival is able to duplicate the
innovation.
36An alternative interpretation is that exploiting confidential information exposes to prosecution
and thus to some penalty later on; “good” types can then simply be interpreted as putting more
weight on future profits. The following analysis corresponds formally to the case where bad types put
no weight on the future, but would apply as well to situations where bad types have a significantly
lower discount factor than good ones.
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We assume that this game is played over two periods, 1 and 2, and that UA
privately learns its own type in the third stage of period 1, thus after price compe-
tition but before deciding whether to exploit its customers’ information.37 Besides
the outcomes of the R&D projects, the other firms only observe whether innovation
eventually takes place. Thus, if only one firm has innovated but both firms launch
a new product, it becomes clear that the innovator’s information has been exploited.
For the sake of exposition, we make the following simplifying assumptions: (i) there is
no discounting (β = 1); (ii) the imitation process is perfect (θ = 1); and (iii) the gain
from duplication is “negligible”: that is, we will set δ = 0, but suppose that a bad
supplier chooses to exploit its customer’s information whenever this yields the same
expected payoﬀ as not exploiting the information).38
We consider below two scenarii, in which UA is either independent or integrated
(UB is independent in both scenarii), and show that integration drastically aﬀects
UA’s incentive to build a reputation of being reliable:39 whereas a good independent
supplier wants to maintain a good reputation, an integrated firm always prefers instead
to appear as a bad supplier, so as to exacerbate the threat of imitation and benefit from
the resulting strategic foreclosure eﬀect. We only sketch the intuition here, starting
with the second period before turning to the first one; the detailed analysis is presented
in Appendix D.
4.2.1 Second period
Let pA denote the revised probability that UA is good at the beginning of period 2.
• Price competition. Since δ = 0, profits can only be earned when a single firm, Di,
say, innovates. If Di is vertically integrated, then its upstream unit will supply it
at cost and protect its innovation. Suppose now that Di is an independent firm and
selects UA. Whether UA is integrated or not then does not aﬀect its reliability: since
exploiting Di’s information brings only a negligible revenue, UA prefers not to do so
when it is “good” (to avoid the cost F ), but chooses to do so when it is “bad” (since
37This simplifies the analysis, by ruling out signalling issues in the first period price competition
stage.
38Accounting for discounting or imperfect imitation is straightforward but notationally cumber-
some. The extension to the case δ > 0 is more involved (in particular, it requires a careful analysis
of signalling issues at the price competition stage) but is available upon request.
39We show below that a downstream firm would indeed rather integrate with the unreliable supplier
than with its competitor.
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it then faces no cost). δ = 0 also implies that UA obtains the same gain whatever
its type; it is therefore natural to focus on pooling equilibria (that is, both types of
UA oﬀer the same TA) with passive beliefs (that is, a deviating oﬀer does not aﬀect
Di’s posterior beliefs). The price competition stage then boils down to a standard
asymmetric Bertrand duopoly, in which UA oﬀers TA = 0 while UB wins with a tariﬀ
reflecting its comparative advantage, TB = (1− pA)∆. In the limit case pA = 1,
TB = TA = 0 and we can assume that UB still wins the competition — selecting UA
would actually be a weakly dominated strategy for Di.
• R&D decisions. Given the outcome of price competition, in the case of vertical
separation each Di’s expected profit is equal to:
Πi = ρi
¡
1− ρj
¢
pA∆− C (ρi) . (23)
The resulting equilibrium R&D eﬀorts are symmetric but lower than ρ∗:
ρ1 = ρ2 = ρˆ
∗ (pA) < ρ∗ = ρˆ
∗ (1) . (24)
Each downstream firm then obtains:
πˆ∗ (pA) ≡ ρˆ∗ (pA) (1− ρˆ∗ (pA)) pA∆− C (ρˆ∗ (pA)) . (25)
If UA is vertically integrated with D1, D2’s expected profit remains given by (23), but
D1 benefits from the protection of its innovation and its expected profit is thus again
given by (2). The resulting equilibrium is thus of the form ρ1 = ρˆ
+ (pA) > ρˆ
∗ (pA) >
ρ2 = ρˆ
− (pA), characterized by the first-order conditions:
C 0 (ρ1) = (1− ρ2)∆, C 0 (ρ2) = (1− ρ1) pA∆. (26)
The resulting profits are then of the form πA1 = πˆ
+ (pA) ≥ πˆ∗ (pA) (with a strict
inequality whenever pA < 1), π2 = πˆ
− (pA) ≤ πˆ∗ (pA) (with a strict inequality when-
ever 0 < pA < 1), and πˆB (pA) ≡ ρˆ− (pA)
¡
1− ρˆ+ (pA)
¢
(1− pA)∆ (which is positive
whenever 0 < pA < 1, and zero otherwise).
An increase in UA’s reputation fosters upstream competition and thus benefits
downstream independent firms; in contrast, the integrated firm UA−D1 benefits from
a reduction in pA, since it raises its rival’s cost. Indeed, we have:
Proposition 12 In the second period, an independent UA always obtains zero profit.
All other equilibrium investments and profits are continuous in the revised belief pA;
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they coincide with the benchmark levels ρ∗ and π∗ when pA = 1, and a reduction in
pA:
(i) reduces independent downstream firms’ investments and profits, down to 0 for
pA = 0.
(ii) benefits instead UA−D1 in case of integration, raising its investment and profit
up to the monopoly level for pA = 0.
Proof. See Appendix D.1.
4.2.2 First period
Consider now the first period. From proposition 12, under vertical separation UA’s
profit in the second period does not depend on its reputation; as a result, UA behaves
as in the last period and, while UB benefits from a comparative advantage when a
single firm innovates, it does not appropriate the entire value of the innovation, and
thus both downstream firms invest in R&D. In contrast, a vertically integrated firm
benefits from a bad reputation. Building on this insight, we now show that, when
F is not too large, if selected by D2 when it is the sole innovator, UA − D1 would
exploit D2’s information even when it is of a good type. As a result, there is complete
foreclosure in the first period: D2 does not invest in R&D, and only the integrated
firm is active in that period.
Vertical separation. Consider first the case of vertical separation. In the price com-
petition stage, symmetric Bertrand competition yields zero profit for the suppliers
when either both or none downstream firm innovates. Suppose now that Di is the
sole innovator and selects UA. Since UA always obtains zero profit in the future, it
then behaves as if this were the last period:
• With probability p, UA learns that it can costlessly exploit Di’s information and
chooses to do so; this leads to pA = 0 in the second period, and thus to zero
profit for all suppliers and downstream firms.
• With probability 1 − p, UA learns that exploiting Di’s information would cost
F and thus refrains from doing so; this leads to pA = 1 in the second period,
and thus again to zero profits for both suppliers but positive expected profits,
π∗, for the downstream firms.
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Since UA also obtains zero profits if not selected, it is willing to supply at cost
(TˆA = 0), thereby giving Di an expected profit equal to p (∆+ π∗). This is better
than what Di would obtain by rejecting all oﬀers, namely πˆ∗ (p) (< p∆). However,
UB: (i) is more reliable (D2 obtains ∆ with probability 1 rather than p); and (ii) if
needed, would be willing to oﬀer a discount, in order to avoid UA’s type being revealed:
UB would then obtain zero profit, whatever the realized type ( πˆB (0) = πˆB (1) = 0)
whereas it obtains πˆB (p) > 0 if UA’s type remains uncertain. Appendix D.2 shows
that, as a result, UB wins the competition but, due to the competitive pressure exerted
by UA, cannot extract all the value from the innovation. Each downstream firm then
invests an amount ρˆV S (p), which is positive as long as p > 0, and obtains a total
expected discounted profit of the form πˆV S (p) + πˆ∗(p), where πˆV S (p) > 0 for any
p > 0.
Vertical integration. We now turn to the case where UA is vertically integrated with
D1. UA then always protects the innovation of its own downstream divisionD1: selling
the innovation to D2 would reduce the first period profit (from ∆ to 0) and, since the
integrated firm has direct access to D1’s information, would not convey any relevant
information on UA’s ability to exploit D2’s innovation in period 2. We now study
UA−D1’s decision to imitate D2’s innovation, before turning to the price competition
stage; we then draw the implications for the overall equilibrium of the game.
Suppose that D2 is the only successful innovator and has selected UA as supplier.
Let denote by
Fˆ (p) ≡ πˆ+ (p)− π∗ > 0 (27)
the expected gain that the integrated firm obtains in period 2 from exploiting D2’s
information in period 1. Intuitively, when this expected gain exceeds the actual cost
F , the integrated supplier has an incentive to exploit its customer’s information even
when being good, in order to maintain the ambiguity and benefit from the resulting
foreclosure eﬀect. Selecting UA then leads to imitation with probability 1, and thus
brings no information about UA’s type.
It follows that, when F < Fˆ , UA −D1 and D2 are actually better oﬀ not dealing
with each other : (i) the value of D2’s innovation would be dissipated via imitation;
(ii) future profits are unaﬀected since D2 would not learn anything about UA’s type;
but (iii) by not supplying D2, UA avoids the risk of having to incur the cost F to
maintain its (bad) reputation, in case it turns out being a good type. As a result,
UB can extract the whole value from D2’s innovation, ∆; it follows that D2 never
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invests in the first period, and thus UA − D1 benefits from a monopoly position in
that period. It thus invests ρm = R (0) and obtains a total expected discounted profit
equal to πm+ πˆ+(p), where πm = maxρ (1− ρ)∆−C (ρ) > πˆV S (p) and πˆ+(p) > πˆ∗(p)
whenever p < 1.
We thus have:
Proposition 13 In the case of vertical separation, UA obtains zero profit while both
downstream firms invest a positive amount in the first period and obtain an expected
profit equal to πˆ∗ (p) in the second period. In contrast, in the case of vertical inte-
gration, if F < Fˆ (p) the integrated firm completely forecloses the market in period
1.
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
Thus, UA (who obtains zero profit in the case of separation) and D1 obtain larger
joint profits when they are vertically integrated, since they benefit from strategic
foreclosure in both periods. Note that, in the first period, complete foreclosure can
arise even when UA is initially perceived as quite reliable (i.e., p close to 1 — the
threshold Fˆ (p) however goes down to 0 as p goes to 1).
4.2.3 Lessons
Welfare implications When F is not too large, a vertical merger between UA and
D1 generates complete foreclosure in the first period, thereby discouraging any rival
R&D investment in that period. Vertical integration however protects the integrated
firm against the risk of imitation, which fosters its own incentives to invest in R&D.
We now discuss the impact of these two eﬀects on innovation and consumer surplus.
Consumer surplus in periods 1 and 2 is respectively equal to:
SCV I1 = 0, SC
V I
2 = ρˆ
+(p)ρˆ−(p)∆. (28)
In the case of vertical separation, D2 buys from UB in the first period, which brings
no information about UA’s type. As a result, consumer surplus is equal to:
SCV S1 = (ρˆ
V S)2∆, SCV S2 = ρˆ
∗(p)2∆. (29)
It can be checked that, in the second period, consumer surplus is higher in the case
of vertical integration; this comes from the “protection” eﬀect just mentioned: while
D2 behaves in the same way in the two scenarii (in both cases, UB supplies D2 with
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a positive tariﬀ reflecting its comparative advantage over UA, who is perceived to be
reliable only with probability p < 1), when vertically integrated D1 obtains the full
value ∆ when it is the sole innovator, which fosters its own R&D eﬀort as well as the
probability that both firms innovate: ρˆ+(p)ρˆ−(p) > (ρˆ∗ (p))2. However, the diﬀerence
tends to disappear when p is large (since ρˆ+(1) = ρˆ−(1) = ρˆ∗(1) = ρ∗).
In contrast, when F < Fˆ (p), then in the first period consumers obtain zero surplus
in case of vertical integration, since the independent rival is then entirely foreclosed,
whereas they obtain a positive surplus in the case of separation, which moreover
increases with p.
This yields:
Proposition 14 As long as F < Fˆ (p), vertical integration harms consumer surplus
when p is large enough.
A similar insight applies to total welfare: when p is large, vertical integration has
not much impact on innovation and thus on welfare in the second period, whereas
(as long as F < Fˆ (p)), it has a drastic impact on the rival’s innovation and thus on
welfare in the first period.
Which merger? A related question concerns the choice of the merger partner.
Suppose for example that D1 merges instead with the more reliable supplier, UB.
In the second period, UB supplies D1 at cost whenever it innovates. In contrast, if
D2 is the sole innovator, than asymmetric Bertrand competition leads UA to oﬀer
TA = 0 and UB to win with TB = (1− pA)∆, where pA denotes as before the revised
probability, at the beginning of the second period, that UA is reliable. D2’s expected
profit thus remains given by (23), but D1’s investment now maximizes:
πB1 = ρ1(1− ρ2)∆+ (1− ρ1)ρ2(1− pA)∆− C(ρ1).
Since the vertically integrated firm now benefits from supplying its rival when it is
the sole innovator, it invests less than before. The resulting investment levels are such
that ρ1 = ρ˜
+(pA) < ρˆ
+(pA) and ρ2 = ρ˜
−(pA) > ρˆ
−(pA). Similarly, the profit of
D2, π˜−(pA), satisfies π˜−(pA) > πˆ
−(pA); for the integrated firm, the resulting profit
π˜+(pA) may also exceed πˆ
+(pA) since, while D1 now faces a more aggressive rival, it
also benefits from supplying it. Note that the equilibrium outcome coincides with the
benchmark case (ρi = ρ
∗ and profit πi = π∗) for pA = 1 and with the monopoly case
(ρ1 = ρ
m, ρ2 = 0 and πB1 = π
m, π2 = 0) for pA = 0.
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Let us now turn to the first period. If D2 is the sole innovator, the independent UA
would be willing to supply at cost, and if selected would imitate only when being bad,
thus giving D2 an expected profit equal to: π˜A2 = p(∆ + π
∗). This oﬀer is attractive
(rejecting all oﬀers would give D2 an expected profit only equal to πˆ
− (p) < p∆),
which implies that the integrated supplier, UB, can no longer extract the full value of
D2’s innovation. As a result, complete foreclosure does not arise anymore in period
1. While D1 might enjoy a greater profit in the second period when merging with UB
rather than UA (if π˜+(p) > πˆ
+(p)), when p is close to 1 (in which case π˜+(p) and πˆ+(p)
are both close to π∗), this cannot oﬀset the profit loss stemming from the reduced
foreclosure eﬀect in the first period. As a result, we have:
Proposition 15 When p is large enough, and F < Fˆ (p), the most profitable vertical
merger involves the supplier whose reputation is uncertain, so as to benefit from a
larger foreclosure eﬀect.
Proof. See Appendix D.3.
Remark: the distinctive nature of imitation. In this section, we validate our
previous working assumption, by showing that vertical integration indeed fosters im-
itation concerns. One could question whether a similar analysis might apply to the
original raising rivals’ cost arguments, in which the integrated firm supplies indepen-
dent rivals at a higher price. This could for example be the case if a supplier could
take irreversible decisions (as in sections 3 and 4.1) that aﬀect the cost or the quality
of their input. While an independent supplier would have the incentives to maintain
good quality or low cost, an integrated firm might instead degrade its cost or quality
conditions in order to benefit from the resulting foreclosure eﬀect. In the absence of
such irreversibility, however, the reputation argument developed here for imitation
concerns is less easily transposed to cost or quality considerations. If for example
the uncertain type concerns the cost of “being unreliable” (i.e., degrading quality or
cost conditions),40 then a “bad” supplier, namely, a supplier who could degrade per-
formance at little cost, would have no incentive to do so anyway in the last periods,
which defeats the reputation argument. If, by contrast, the type concerns the cost of
“being reliable” (i.e., having the capacity of delivering good quality at low price), an
integrated firm could be tempted to pretend being unreliable, but to be consistent this
40For example, in order to degrade the quality oﬀered to rivals, the supplier might need to set-up
distinct production lines and face diseconomies of scale as well as increased organizational costs.
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would require degrading the performance of its own subsidiary, which would reduce
and possibly oﬀset the benefit from foreclosure.
5 Conclusion
This article shows that vertical integration may generate foreclosure. The seminal
paper by Ordover Saloner and Salop (1990), which provided a first consistent vertical
foreclosure theory, relied on two critical assumptions. First, the vertically integrated
firm had to be able to commit itself not to supply downstream rivals, in order to give
greater market power to remaining suppliers. Second, in order to weaken downstream
competition, this enhanced market power had to translate into higher input prices (as
opposed to higher fixed fees or profit-based royalties, say). In our framework, foreclo-
sure relies instead on innovation incentives and on the threat of information leakages
between the integrated supplier and its downstream subsidiary. Thus, whenever ver-
tical integration creates or exacerbates such security problems, foreclosure arises even
absent any commitment capability — the integrated supplier’s reliability concern suf-
fices to weaken its ability to supply downstream rivals — or any ex post contractual
ineﬃciency — downstream rivals must therefore share the value of their innovation
with the remaining suppliers, which suﬃces to discourage their R&D eﬀorts.
We further show that vertical integration indeed drastically aﬀects a supplier’s in-
centive to protect or exploit its customers’ innovation. Where an independent supplier
has an incentive to protect its customers’ innovation, so as to maintain its reputa-
tion as a reliable supplier, an integrated supplier can instead prefer to degrade that
reputation, in order to enjoy the resulting strategic foreclosure benefit.
This analysis has direct policy implications for antitrust or merger policy. For
example, even in an industry where (possibly costly) instruments exist for protecting
customers’ innovation (such as firewalls, compensating guarantees, and so forth), a
merged entity may lack the incentives to invest in such instruments — and may rather
choose to invest in (possibly costly) reverse engineering technology or other ways to
exploit its customers’ innovation. Therefore, such protective instruments should be
required for merger approval. Besides, our results speak in favor of ex-ante rather
than ex-post merger control. In our model, no imitation happens in equilibrium, as
the very threat of information disclosure is suﬃcient to create foreclosure. This tends
to highlight the ineﬃciency of a merger authorization followed by an ex-post control
of anticompetitive behavior: if protective measures are not required at the time of the
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merger, the integrated firm has no incentives to provide such measures and foreclosure
may arise without any ex post anticompetitive behavior.
While this paper emphasizes the adverse impact of vertical integration on infor-
mation leaks and foreclosure, the same analysis could have diﬀerent implications in
diﬀerent industry situations.
For instance, in markets where the risk of information leaks already exists even in
the absence of vertical integration, a vertical merger would again exacerbate this risk
for the independent rivals, but would also induce the integrated firm to better protect
its own subsidiary, the overall impact of vertical integration on industry innovation,
consumers, and welfare would then be more ambiguous. Also, if the upstream market
is quasi-monopolized, then vertical integration and the associated foreclosure eﬀect
may well distort downstream competition in a way that reduces the merging parties’
profit. This concern has for instance been mentioned in 1999 by General Motors (GM)
as a motivation for spinning-oﬀ its auto parts subsidiary Delphi, so as to enable it
to contract with other automakers, which were reluctant to rely on Delphi as long
as it was a unit of GM.41 A similar concern may underlie AT&T’s 1995 voluntary
divestiture of its manufacturing arm, AT&T Technology (now Lucent), as the 1996
Telecommunication Act was due to allow the RBOCs to compete with AT&T on the
long distance market.42 Finally, while we focus on situation where the information
leaks intensify competition and dissipate profits, Milliou and Petrakis (2010) consider
an alternative situation in which information flows increase industry profit: Namely,
imitation expands demand more than it intensifies competition. In this context, the
integrated firm may well choose to communicate information from its own subsidiary
to the downstream rival and vertical integration may benefit consumers as well as
firms.
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Appendix
A Complementary investments
We prove here Proposition 8. Suppose that the probability of successful imitation
is equal to θUθD, where θU and θD are unobservable and respectively controlled by
the upstream and downstream firms. Suppose further that: (i) each θi can take two
values, high
¡
θ
¢
or low (θ), with 0 < θ < θ ≤ 1; and (ii) opting for the low value θ
gives the controlling firm a private, non-transferable benefit b > 0, whereas successful
imitation gives the downstream firm a monetary benefit δ > 0.
• If the firms are vertically separated, in order to provide adequate incentives the
downstream firm can pay some amount φ to the supplier in case of successful
imitation. The risk of imitation is then maximal (that is, θU = θD = θ) if and
only if:
— the upstream firm prefers θ to θ, that is:
θθφ ≥ θθφ+ b,
— the downstream firm does the same, that is:
θθ(δ − φ) ≥ θθ(δ − φ) + b.
Summing-up these two conditions, the risk of imitation can be maximal only if:
θθδ ≥ θθδ + 2b,
that is, only if:
δ ≥ 2b¡
θ − θ
¢
θ
. (30)
• If instead the two firms are vertically integrated, the risk of imitation is maximal
whenever the integrated firm prefers both divisions providing a high eﬀort rather
than:
— only one doing so, which requires:
θθδ ≥ θθδ + b,
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— none doing so, which requires:
θ
2
δ ≥ θ2δ + 2b.
Of these two constraints, the latter is the most demanding43 and can be rewritten
as:
δ ≥ 2b¡
θ − θ
¢ ¡
θ + θ
¢ , (31)
which is less demanding than the condition (30) required in the absence of
vertical integration. The conclusion follows.
B Reverse engineering
As already established in Section 3.1, no independent supplier will ever invest in
reverse engineering. Therefore, when both suppliers are vertically separated, standard
Bertrand competition among equally reliable suppliers yields TAi = TBi = 0 (even
when only one downstream firm innovates), the downstream firms invest ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ
∗,
characterized by the first-order condition (4), and obtain an expected profit equal to
Π∗ ≡ Π (ρ∗, ρ∗), whereas upstream firms make no profit.
Suppose now that UA and D1, say, have merged, whereas UB remains independent
— and thus chooses to be reliable. As already noted in Section 3.1, the integrated
firm never provides internal information to its independent rival; that is, vertical
integration de facto protects D1 against imitation. Moreover, if both firms innovate, a
customer’s information has no market value; whether a supplier is reliable is therefore
irrelevant: standard Bertrand competition among the suppliers always yields TAi =
TBi = 0 and thus each downstream firm obtains a profit equal to δ. The only remaining
relevant case is when D2 is the sole successful innovator:
• If both UA−D1 and UB are reliable suppliers, Bertrand competition drives again
tariﬀs to zero. Expected downstream profits are thus again Πi
¡
ρi, ρj
¢
and both
investments are equal to ρ∗. UA −D1’s expected profit is thus still equal to Π∗.
• If instead UA − D1 is an unreliable supplier, it oﬀers D2 a subsidy of up to
TA2 = −δ but UB wins by charging TB2 = ∆− 2δ. The expected profits of the
43To see this, note that they are respectively equivalent to b ≤ δ
¡
θ − θ
¢
θ and b ≤ δ
¡
θ − θ
¢ θ+θ
2 .
The conclusion then follows from θ > θ.
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investing firms are then respectively ΠA1 = Π (ρ1, ρ2), and Π2 = Πθ (ρ2, ρ1) .The
equilibrium investments are thus ρ1 = ρ
+
θ > ρ
∗ > ρ2 = ρ
−
θ , and UA − D1’s
expected profit is Π+θ > Π
∗.
UA −D1 therefore invests in reverse engineering whenever F < Π+θ −Π∗.
C Guarantees
In this Appendix, we prove Proposition 10, assuming that firm D1 (resp. D2) obtains
a small surplus γ (in case of innovation) when buying from his favored supplier UA
(resp. UB).
Suppliers’ reliability is irrelevant when both downstream firms’ innovation eﬀorts
are successful. In that case, for each Di, asymmetric Bertrand competition leads
Di’s favored supplier to win the competition with a tariﬀ appropriating the surplus
γ: letting “f” designate the favored supplier and “n” refer to the other, non-favored
supplier, Un oﬀers Di a tariﬀ Tn = 0, but Uf wins with a tariﬀ (slightly below) Tf = γ.
As a result, each Di obtains a profit equal to δ.
Suppliers’ reliability instead matters when only one downstream firm successfully
innovates. While an integrated supplier will always protect the information from
its own subsidiary, unreliable suppliers would be willing to trade the information
obtained from their independent customers. We now study the implications under
vertical separation and partial integration.
Vertical separation.
• If both suppliers are reliable, and only Di innovates, then asymmetric Bertrand
competition leads Di’s favored supplier to win with a tariﬀ reflecting its comparative
advantage; Di thus obtains ∆ while its favored supplier obtains γ. EachDi’s expected
profit is therefore given by Πi = Π
¡
ρi, ρj
¢
, and equilibrium investments are thus
ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ
∗. Since suppliers obtain γ whenever the downstream firm that favors
them innovates, their equilibrium expected profits are both equal to:
ΠV Srr ≡ ρ∗γ.
• Suppose now that both suppliers are unreliable, and thatDi is the only successful
innovator. Asymmetric Bertrand competition leads the non-favored supplier, Un, to
oﬀer Tn = −θδ, while the favored supplier wins with Tf = γ − θδ, and then sells (at
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“full” price θδ) the information to the downstream rival, who duplicates the innovation
with probability θ. Thus, Di obtains
θδ + (1− θ)∆+ γ − Tf = θδ + (1− θ)∆− Tn = ∆− θ (∆− 2δ) ,
while its favored supplier obtains Tf + θδ = γ.
Ex ante, each Di’s expected profit is thus Πi = Πθ
¡
ρi, ρj
¢
. Both best responses are
thus of the form ρi = Rθ
¡
ρj
¢
< R
¡
ρj
¢
, and equilibrium investments are symmetric:
ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ
∗
θ < ρ
∗. Suppliers’ equilibrium expected profits are thus lower than before
and now equal to
ΠV Suu ≡ ρ∗θγ.
• Suppose now that UA, say, is unreliable whereas UB is reliable. As long as relia-
bility matters more than suppliers’ diﬀerentiation (namely, as long as γ < θ (∆− 2δ)),
then whenDi is the only successful innovator Bertrand competition results in UA oﬀer-
ing TAi = −θδ and UB winning with a tariﬀ that leaves Di almost indiﬀerent between
the two oﬀers. Thus, when D1 is the sole innovator, UB charges TB1 = θ (∆− 2δ)− γ
and D1 obtains ∆− θ (∆− 2δ) + γ; when instead D2 is the only successful innovator,
then UB wins by oﬀering TB2 = θ (∆− 2δ) + γ and D2 obtains ∆− θ (∆− 2δ). The
expected profits of the two downstream firms are thus respectively:
Π1 = Π
γ
θ (ρ1, ρ2) ≡ ρ1 (ρ2δ + (1− ρ2) (∆− θ (∆− 2δ) + γ))− C (ρ1)
= Πθ (ρ2, ρ1) + ρ1 (1− ρ2) γ,
and
Π2 = Πθ (ρ2, ρ1) .
Best responses are therefore of the form ρ2 = Rθ (ρ1) and ρ1 = R
γ
θ (ρ2), which is
characterized by the first-order condition:
C 0 (ρ1) = ρ2δ + (1− ρ2) (∆− θ (∆− 2δ) + γ) ,
and thus satisfies Rθ (ρ) < R
γ
θ (ρ) < R (ρ). Note that D1 benefits from UB’s superior
reliability, as it forces its favorite supplier, UA, to concede better terms (that is, UA
gives back γ). As a result, equilibrium investments are asymmetric and such that
ρ1 = ρ˜
+ > ρ∗θ > ρ2 = ρ˜
−: UB’s superior reliability actually reduces its best customer’s
R&D eﬀort, since its rival, D1, who benefits from UB’s competitive pressure on UA,
becomes more aggressive.
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Note that UA now obtains a positive profit only when both downstream firms’
innovation eﬀorts are successful. Its expected profit is equal to:
ΠA = Π
V S
ur ≡ ρ˜−ρ˜+γ,
whereas UB’s expected profit is equal to:
ΠB = Π
V S
ru ≡ ρ˜−ρ˜+γ + ρ˜−
¡
1− ρ˜+
¢
(θ (∆− 2δ) + γ) +
¡
1− ρ˜−
¢
ρ˜+ (θ (∆− 2δ)− γ) .
UA’s expected profit is lower than ΠV Srr , since ρ˜
−ρ˜+ < ρ˜− < ρ∗θ < ρ
∗. As for UB’s
expected profit, it exceeds ΠV Suu whenever reliability matters suﬃciently more than
product diﬀerentiation. For example, when
γ < γV S ≡ θ (∆− 2δ) /2,
then ex post UB obtains at least γ whenever at least one firm innovates, and thus
ΠV Sru > ρ˜
+γ > ρ∗θγ = Π
V S
uu .
Therefore, as long as γ < γˆV S we have:
ΠV Suu < Π
V S
ru and Π
V S
ur < Π
V S
rr .
This, in turn, implies that providing guarantees constitutes a dominant strategy when-
ever ϕ < ϕV S ≡ min
©
ΠV Srr −ΠV Sur ,ΠV Sru −ΠV Suu
ª
.
Vertical integration.
Suppose now that UA and D1 are vertically integrated whereas UB and D2 remain
independent. Vertical integration protects D1 against imitation and moreover allows
it to internalize the full value of its innovation.
• Suppose first that the independent supplier is at least as reliable as the integrated
supplier (that is, both suppliers are reliable, both are unreliable, or UA is unreliable
whereas UB is reliable). UA −D1’s expected profit is then equal to:44
ΠA1 = Π
γ (ρ1, ρ2) ≡ ρ1 (ρ2δ + (1− ρ2)∆+ γ)− C (ρ1) ,
The corresponding best response, ρ1 = R
γ (ρ2), is characterized by the first-order
condition:
C 0 (ρ1) = ρ2δ + (1− ρ2)∆+ γ.
44Note that D1 does not make any additional profit when UB is unreliable and only D2’s R&D
project succeeds, since UB then sells the information at its full value θδ.
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It thus satisfies Rγ (ρ) > R (ρ), Rγ (0) > 0, and:
0 > Rγ0 (ρ) =
− (∆− δ)
C 00 (Rγ (ρ))
> −1.
D2’s expected profit is equal toΠ (ρ2, ρ1) if both suppliers are reliable, and toΠθ (ρ2, ρ1)
if the integrated firm is not reliable;45 therefore:
• When both suppliers are reliable, D2’s best response is given by ρ2 = R (ρ1); we
will denote by (ργ+, ργ−) the resulting equilibrium investments. Since UB then
extracts its comparative advantage γ whenever D2 innovates, its expected profit
is equal to:
ΠB = Π
V I
rr ≡ ργ−γ.
• If instead UA is not reliable, D2’s best response is given by ρ2 = Rθ (ρ1) and we
will denote by
¡
ργ+θ , ρ
γ−
θ
¢
the resulting equilibrium investments; simple compar-
ative statics yield ργ−θ < ρ
γ− < ρ∗ and ργ+θ > ρ
γ+ > ρ∗. UB extracts again its
comparative advantage γ whenever D2 innovates, but this benefit depends on
its reliability decision:
— If UB is not reliable either, its expected profit is simply equal to:
ΠB = Π
V I
uu ≡ ργ−θ γ.
— If instead UB is reliable, it benefits from a larger comparative advantage
when only D2 innovates and its expected profit is then:
ΠB = Π
V I
ru ≡ ργ−θ
¡
γ +
¡
1− ργ+θ
¢
θ (∆− 2δ)
¢
.
• Suppose now that the integrated supplier is more reliable than its independent
rival. Then, when D2 is the sole innovator UB oﬀers TB2 = −θδ but UA − D1 wins
by oﬀering TA2 = θ (∆− 2δ)− γ. The expected profits of the two investing firms are
then equal to:
ΠA1 = Π˚ (ρ1, ρ2) ≡ Πγ (ρ1, ρ2) + (1− ρ1) ρ2 (θ (∆− 2δ)− γ) ,
45D2 obtains δ if both downstream innovation eﬀorts are successful. If it is the sole innovator, it
obtains ∆ if both suppliers are reliable. If UA is not reliable, then UB will extract its comparative
advantage (γ if it is unreliable, and γ+θ (∆− 2δ) if instead it is reliable) and leave only∆−θ (∆− 2δ)
to D2.
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and
Π2 = Π
γ
θ (ρ2, ρ1) = ρ2 (ρ1δ + (1− ρ1) (∆− θ (∆− 2δ) + γ))− C (ρ2) .
D2’s best response is thus ρ2 = R
γ
θ (ρ1), whereas UA − D1’s best response is of the
form ρ1 = R˚ (ρ2), characterized by the first-order condition:
C 0 (ρ1) = ρ2δ + (1− ρ2)∆+ γ − ρ2 (θ (∆− 2δ)− γ)
= ρ2 (δ − (θ (∆− 2δ)− γ)) + (1− ρ2)∆+ γ.
We will denote by (˚ρ1, ρ˚2) the corresponding equilibrium investments. UB’s expected
profit is then equal to:
ΠB = Π
V I
ur ≡ ρ˚1˚ρ2γ.
• Let us now study the reliability decisions. If UA−D1 chooses not to be reliable,
then as long as ργ−θ > 0 (that is, as long as there is only partial foreclosure, or θ < 1),
UB benefits from being reliable, since this increases its expected profit from ΠV Iuu to
ΠV Iru = Π
V I
uu+ρ
γ−
θ
¡
1− ργ+θ
¢
θ (∆− 2δ) > ΠV Iuu . If instead UA−D1 chooses to be reliable,
UB’s benefit from reliability is equal to:
ΠV Irr −ΠV Iur =
¡
ργ− − ρ˚1˚ρ2
¢
γ.
When γ tends to zero, ργ− converges to ρ∗θ, solution to ρ = Rθ (ρ), whereas (˚ρ1, ρ˚2)
tends to
¡˚
ρ01, ρ˚
0
2
¢
, which in particular satisfies ρ2 = Rθ (ρ1). In the limit, the diﬀerence
ργ− − ρ˚1˚ρ2 thus converges towards ρ∗θ − ρ˚01, ρ˚02, which is positive: since both (ρ∗θ, ρ∗θ)
and
¡˚
ρ01, ρ˚
0
2
¢
lie on the best response ρ2 = Rθ (ρ1), which has a negative slope, ρ
∗
θ is
greater than either ρ˚01 or ρ˚
0
2, and thus (since moreover ρ˚
0
i ≤ 1) exceeds their product.
Therefore, there exists γV I such that ΠV Irr −ΠV Iur > 0 as long as γ < γV I . In this range,
it is a dominant strategy for the independent supplier to oﬀer guarantees as long as
ϕ < ϕV I ≡ min
©
ΠV Irr −ΠV Iur ,ΠV Iru −ΠV Iuu
ª
.
Consider now the reliability decision of the integrated firm, when facing a reliable
rival. Being reliable yields an expected profit equal to Πγ (ργ+, ργ−) − ϕ, whereas
being unreliable yields:
Πγ
¡
ργ+θ , ρ
γ−
θ
¢
= max
ρ1
Πγ
¡
ρ1, ρ
γ−
θ
¢
> max
ρ1
Πγ
¡
ρ1, ρ
γ−¢ = Πγ ¡ργ+, ργ−¢ ,
where the inequality stems from ργ−θ < ρ
γ−. It follows that it is best for UA −D1 to
be unreliable (by denying guarantees), so as to benefit from the foreclosure eﬀect.
To recap:
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• when γ < min©γV S, γV Iª, it is always a dominant strategy for an independent
supplier to provide guarantees as long as the cost of doing so does not exceed
min
©
ϕV S, ϕV I
ª
).
• by contrast, when facing a reliable independent supplier, an integrated firm finds
it optimal to appear unreliable by denying guarantees.
Which merger? We now check that D1 prefers indeed to merge with its favorite
supplier UA rather than with UB. Assume instead that D1 and UB have merged;
depending on the reliability decisions of the suppliers we need to consider four cases:
1. Both UA and UB are reliable:
ΠB1 = Π(ρ1, ρ2) + ρ2γ,Π2 = Π(ρ1, ρ2),
and the equilibrium investments are thus ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ
∗.46 UA’s profit is therefore
ΠA = ΠV Irr = ρ
∗γ.
2. UA is reliable and UB is unreliable:
ΠB1 = Πˆ
γ(ρ1, ρ2) ≡ Π(ρ1, ρ2)+ρ1ρ2γ,Π2 = Πγθ (ρ2, ρ1) = Πθ (ρ2, ρ1)+ρ2 (1− ρ1) γ.
Investment behaviors are thus of the form ρ1 = Rˆ
γ (ρ2) ∈ [R (ρ2) , Rγ (ρ2)] (with
Rˆγ (ρ) > R (ρ) whenever ρ > 0) and ρ2 = Rˆθ (ρ1) ∈ [Rθ (ρ1) , R (ρ1)] (with
R (ρ) < Rˆθ (ρ) < Rθ (ρ) whenever ρ < 1); the resulting equilibrium investments
are thus of the form ρ1 = ρˆ
γ+
θ and ρ2 = ρˆ
γ−
θ , where
ργ−θ < ρˆ
γ−
θ < ρ
∗ < ρˆγ+θ < ρ
γ+
θ . (32)
UA’s profit is then ΠA = ΠV Iru = ρˆ
γ+
θ γ + ρˆ
γ−
θ (1− ρˆ
γ+
θ ) [θ(∆− 2δ)− γ].
3. Both UA and UB are unreliable:
ΠB1 = Π(ρ1, ρ2) + ρ2γ,Π2 = Πθ (ρ2, ρ1) .
The best responses are thus ρ1 = R (ρ2) and ρ2 = Rθ (ρ1), and the resulting
equilibrium investments are ρ1 = ρ
+
θ and ρ2 = ρ
−
θ . Supplier A’s profits is
therefore ΠA = ΠV Iuu = ρ
+
θ ρ
−
θ γ.
46Note that, since ρ2 aﬀects ΠB1 in an additive separable way, it does not aﬀect D1’s innovation
behavior, which remains given by ρ1 = R (ρ2).
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4. UA is unreliable and UB is reliable:
ΠB1 = Πˇ(ρ1, ρ2) ≡ Π(ρ1, ρ2) + ρ2γ + ρ2(1− ρ1)θ(∆− 2δ),Π2 = Πθ (ρ2, ρ1) .
We will denote by ρ1 = ρ˘
+
θ and ρ2 = ρ˘
−
θ the resulting equilibrium investments,
characterized by the best responses ρ2 = Rθ (ρ1) and ρ1 = Rˇ (ρ2), where Rˇ (ρ2) <
R (ρ1). Supplier A’s profits is then ΠA = Π
V I
ur = ρ˘
+
θ ρ˘
−
θ γ.
It is first easy to check that, whatever the reliability decision of UB − D1, UA
strictly prefers to be reliable:
• If UB −D1 is reliable, UA obtains ρ∗γ if reliable and ΠV Iur = ρ˘+θ ρ˘−θ γ if unreliable;
but since the best responses Rθ (.) and Rˇ (.) have a negative slope and are both
lower than R (.), it follows that ρ˘−θ ρ˘
+
θ < ρ
∗.47 Thus, UA chooses to be reliable.
• When facing an unreliable UB−D1, UA obtains ΠA = ΠV Iuu = ρ+θ ρ−θ γ if unreliable
and ΠV Iru = ρˆ
γ+
θ γ + ρˆ
γ−
θ (1− ρˆ
γ+
θ ) [θ(∆− 2δ)− γ] if reliable. Since
ΠV Iru > ρˆ
γ+
θ γ > ρ
∗γ > ρ−θ γ > Π
V I
uu ,
UA again prefers being reliable.
Second, whatever UB −D1’s reliability, its profit is always lower than foreclosure
profit that D1 would obtain by merging with UA, Πγ(ρ
γ+
θ , ρ
γ−
θ ):
• If UB − D1 is reliable, its profit is Π(ρ∗, ρ∗) + ρ∗γ = Πγ(ρ∗, ρ∗) and ργ−θ < ρ∗
implies:
Πγ(ρ∗, ρ∗) < max
ρ1
Πγ(ρ1, ρ
∗) < max
ρ1
Πγ(ρ1, ρ
γ−
θ ) = Π
γ(ργ+θ , ρ
γ−
θ ).
• If UB −D1 is instead unreliable, its profit is: Πˆγ(ρˆγ+θ , ρˆγ−θ ), and:
Πˆγ(ρˆγ+θ , ρˆ
γ−
θ ) = maxρ1
Πˆγ(ρ1, ρˆ
γ−
θ ) < maxρ1
Πγ(ρ1, ρˆ
γ−
θ ) < maxρ1
Πγ(ρ1, ρ
γ−
θ ) = Π
γ(ργ+θ , ρ
γ−
θ ),
where the last inequality stems from ρˆγ−θ > ρ
γ−
θ .
47This is obvious if ρ˘−θ and ρ˘
+
θ are both lower than ρ
∗; if instead one — ρi, say — exceeds ρ
∗, than
the other one satisfies ρj = Rj (ρi) < Rj (ρ
∗) < R (ρ∗) = ρ∗.
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D Reputation
D.1 Proof of Proposition 12
D.1.1 Vertical separation
Given the outcome of price competition, in the case of vertical separation the equilib-
rium profits are then
π1 = π2 = πˆ
∗ (pA) ≡ ρˆ∗ (pA) (1− ρˆ∗ (pA))pA∆− C (ρˆ∗ (pA)) ,
πA = 0,
πB = 2ρˆ
∗ (pA) (1− ρˆ∗ (pA)) (1− pA)∆.
Note that the equilibrium profits increase with pA. Indeed, the envelope theorem
yields:
πˆ∗0 (pA) = ρˆ∗ (pA) (1− ρˆ∗ (pA))∆− ρˆ∗ (pA) ρˆ∗0 (pA) pA∆,
while diﬀerentiating the first-order condition C 0 (ρˆ∗ (pA)) = (1− ρˆ∗ (pA))pA∆ yields:
ρˆ∗0 (pA) =
(1− ρˆ∗ (pA))∆
C 00 (ρˆ∗) + pA∆
(> 0) .
Therefore:
πˆ∗0 (pA) =
ρˆ∗ (pA) (1− ρˆ∗ (pA))∆C 00 (ρˆ∗ (pA))
C 00 (ρˆ∗ (pA)) + pA∆
> 0.
Therefore, as pA increases from 0 to 1, the equilibrium profits increase from πˆ
∗ (0) = 0
to πˆ∗ (1) = π∗.
D.1.2 Vertical integration
If UA is vertically integrated with D1, the equilibrium profits are then of the form
πA1 = πˆ
+ (pA), π2 = πˆ− (pA), and πB = ρˆ− (pA)
¡
1− ρˆ+ (pA)
¢
(1− pA)∆. In particu-
lar, the eﬀort and the profit of the vertically integrated firm increase as its perceived
quality, pA, decreases; indeed, as pA decreases from 1 to 0:
• ρˆ− (pA) decreases from the symmetric competitive level ρ∗ to 0 ;
• ρˆ+ (pA) therefore increases ρ∗ to ρm, the monopoly level satisfying C 0 (ρm) = ∆;
• as a result, πˆ+ (pA) increases from the competitive level π∗ to the monopoly
level, πm = maxρ ρ∆− C (ρ).
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D.2 Proof of Proposition 13
We consider in turn the separation and integration cases.
D.2.1 Vertical separation
Suppose that Di, being the sole innovator, selects UA as an independent supplier.
UA then behaves as if this were the last period, since it obtains zero future profit
anyway; it thus exploits Di’s innovation only when learning that it is of a bad type.
The expected gross profits of Di, UA and UB are therefore respectively equal to:
πAi ≡ (1− p)× 0 + p (∆+ π∗) = p (∆+ π∗) ,
πAA ≡ 0,
πAB ≡ 0 + p× πˆB (1) + (1− p)× πˆB (0) = 0,
where the superscript A denotes the selected supplier. Since UA also obtains zero
profits if not selected, it is willing to supply at cost (TˆA = 0), which would give Di an
expected profit equal to:
πˆAi = π
A
i − TˆA = p (∆+ π∗) .
This is better than what Di would obtain by rejecting all oﬀers, namely πˆ
∗ (p) =
ρˆ∗ (p) (1− ρˆ∗ (p)) p∆− C (ρˆ∗) < p∆.
If instead Di selects UB, then these expected profits depend on the prior belief
(which remains unchanged for the second period) and become respectively:
πBi ≡ ∆+ πˆ∗ (p) ,
πBA ≡ 0,
πBB ≡ 0 + 2ρˆ∗ (p) (1− ρˆ∗ (p)) (1− p)∆ = 2ρˆ∗ (p) (1− ρˆ∗ (p)) (1− p)∆.
In the price competition stage, UB is thus willing to oﬀer up to:
TˆB ≡ −
¡
πBB − πAB
¢
= −2ρˆ∗ (p) (1− ρˆ∗ (p)) (1− p)∆ < 0,
which would give Di an expected profit equal to:
πˆBi ≡ πBi − TˆB = ∆+ πˆ∗ (p) + 2ρˆ∗ (p) (1− ρˆ∗ (p)) (1− p)∆.
This best oﬀer beats UA’s one, since:
πˆBi − πˆAi = ∆+ πˆ∗ (p) + 2ρˆ∗ (p) (1− ρˆ∗ (p)) (1− p)∆− p (∆+ π∗)
≥ φ (p) ≡ (1− p)∆+ πˆ∗ (p)− pπ∗,
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where φ (p) > 0 for p < 1, since φ (1) = 0 and
φ0 (p) = −∆
µ
1− ρˆ∗ (1− ρˆ∗) C
00 (ρˆ∗)
C 00 (ρˆ∗) + p∆
¶
− π∗ < 0.
Therefore, UB wins the competition, by oﬀering a tariﬀ that gives Di the same ex-
pected profit as πˆAi = p (∆+ π
∗). Ex ante, each Di’s expected profit is therefore equal
to:
πi = ρi(1− ρj)πˆAi + (1− ρi(1− ρj))(0 + πˆ∗(p))− C(ρi)
= πˆ∗(p) + ρi(1− ρj)(p(∆+ π∗)− πˆ∗(p))− C(ρi).
It follows that the R&D equilibrium is symmetric:
ρ1 = ρ2 = ρˆ
V S (p) ,
characterized by the first-order condition:
C 0 (ρ) = (1− ρ) [p (∆+ π∗)− πˆ∗(p)] .
ρˆV S (p) moreover strictly increases from 0 to ρ∗ as p increases from 0 to 1:
dρˆV S
dp
=
¡
1− ρˆV S
¢
(∆+ π∗ − πˆ∗0(p))
C 00
¡
ρˆV S
¢
+ p (∆+ π∗)− πˆ∗(p)
,
where the numerator is positive since:
πˆ∗0(p) =
C 00 (ρˆ∗)
C 00 (ρˆ∗) + p∆
ρˆ∗ (1− ρˆ∗)∆ < ∆,
whereas the denominator is also positive since πˆ∗(p) < p∆. Each downstream firm
then obtains a total expected discounted profit equal to πˆV S (p) + πˆ∗(p), where:
πˆV S (p) ≡ ρˆV S(1− ρˆV S)(p(∆+ π∗)− πˆ∗(p))− C(ρˆV S).
D.2.2 Vertical integration
As discussed in the text, when UA is vertically integrated with D1, UA always protects
the innovation of its own downstream division D1. If instead D2 is the only successful
innovator and selects UA, we have:
Lemma 16 When F < Fˆ , if D2 is the sole innovator and selects UA, then the inte-
grated firm imitates D2’s innovation, whatever UA’s type.
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Proof. Consider a candidate equilibrium in which UA − D1 imitates D2’s inno-
vation with probability µb when it is bad, and with probability µg when it is good.
If µg > µb, imitating enhances the reputation of the firm: in the second period, D2’s
updated belief, piA, satisfies
piA ≡
pµg
pµg + (1− p)µb
> p.
In contrast, by not imitating D2’s innovation, the integrated firm would strategically
benefit from a downgraded reputation in the second period: D2’s updated belief, pnA,
would then satisfy
pnA ≡
p
¡
1− µg
¢
p
¡
1− µg
¢
+ (1− p) (1− µb)
< p.
Since the expected continuation profit πˆ+ (pA) increases as pA decreases, a good firm
would rather not imitate, as this moreover saves the cost F , contradicting the initial
assumption µg > µb. We can thus suppose µg ≤ µb, which in turn implies pnA ≥ p ≥ piA.
Imitating cost nothing to a bad firm and, by downgrading the reputation of the firm,
can only increase its expected profit in the second period. Therefore, according to
our tie-breaking assumption, a bad firm chooses to imitate D2’s innovation. We thus
have µg ≤ µb = 1, which implies
piA =
pµg
pµg + 1− p
≤ p.
Imitating then costs F to a good firm but increases second-period profits from πˆ+ (1) =
π∗ to πˆ+ (piA) ≥ πˆ+ (p). Therefore, as long as F < Fˆ , even a good integrated firm
chooses to imitate D2’s innovation
¡
µg = µb = 1
¢
: the integrated firm always imi-
tates D2’s innovation, whatever UA’s type, leading to unchanged beliefs in the second
period: piA = p.
Thus, if F < Fˆ , then if D2 selects UA the expected profits of UA−D1, D2 and UB
are respectively equal to:
πAA1 ≡ −pF + πˆ+ (p) ,
πA2 ≡ 0 + πˆ− (p) = πˆ− (p) ,
πAB ≡ 0 + ρˆ− (p)
¡
1− ρˆ+ (p)
¢
(1− p)∆ = ρˆ− (p)
¡
1− ρˆ+ (p)
¢
(1− p)∆.
If D2 was to reject all oﬀers, it would obtain the same profit πˆ− (p), whereas UA−D1
would obtain πˆ+ (p) and thus save the expected cost pF that it may have to face it
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if it turns out to be of a good type. Therefore, D2 and UA − D1 are better oﬀ not
dealing with each other. In contrast, D2 and UB can together generate an extra profit
∆. Thus, UB wins the competition but, since D2 second-best option is to reject all
oﬀers, UB extracts all the value from D2’s innovation, by oﬀering a tariﬀ TB = ∆.
It follows that D2 never invests in the first period, and thus UA−D1 benefits from
a monopoly position in that period; it thus maximizes:
πA1 = ρ1∆− C(ρ1) + πˆ+(p),
and chooses the investment level ρm.
Compared with the case of vertical separation, whenever p < 1, UA and D1 joint
profit increases in the second period, from πˆ∗ (p) to πˆ+ (p), and it also increases in the
first period, since:
πˆV S (p) = max
ρ
ρ(1− ρˆV S)(p(∆+ π∗)− πˆ∗(p))− C(ρ)
< max
ρ
ρ (p(∆+ π∗)− πˆ∗(p))− C(ρ)
< max
ρ
ρ∆− C(ρ) = πm,
where the last inequality stems from
d ((p(∆+ π∗)− πˆ∗(p)))
dp
= ∆+ π∗ − πˆ∗0(p) > 0,
and:
(p(∆+ π∗)− πˆ∗(p))|p=1 = ∆.
D.3 Proof of Proposition 15
In the second period, the investment levels, ρ1 = ρ˜
+(pA) and ρ2 = ρ˜
−(pA), are char-
acterized by the following first-order conditions:
C 0(ρ1) = (1− ρ2(2− pA))∆, C 0(ρ2) = (1− ρ1)pA∆, (33)
and the resulting expected profits are:
πB1 = π˜+(pA) ≡ ρ˜+ (pA) (1− ρ˜− (pA))∆+ (1− ρ˜+ (pA))ρ˜− (pA) (1− pA)∆− C(ρ˜+ (pA)),
π2 = π˜−(pA) ≡ ρ˜− (pA) (1− ρ˜+ (pA))pA∆− C(ρ˜+ (pA)).
As noted in the text, we have ρ˜+(pA) < ρˆ
+(pA), ρˆ
−(pA) > ρˆ
−(pA), and π˜−(pA) >
πˆ−(pA). In addition, the outcome coincides with the benchmark case (ρ∗ and π∗) for
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pA = 1 and with the monopoly case (ρ1 = ρ
m, ρ2 = 0 and πB1 = π
m, π2 = 0) for
pA = 0.
Let us now turn to the first period, and suppose that D2 is the sole innovator.
Selecting UA would lead it to exploit D2’s innovation only when being bad. The
expected profits of UA, D2 and UB −D1 are then:
πAA = 0, π
A
2 = p(∆+ π
∗), πAB1 = pπ
∗ + (1− p)πm.
If instead D2 selects UB, these expected profits become:
πBA = 0, π
B
2 = ∆+ π˜
−(p), πBB1 = π˜
+(p).
Suppliers thus are ready to oﬀer up to:
T˜A = −(πAA − πBA) = 0, T˜B = −(πBB1 − πAB1) = pπ∗ + (1− p)πm − π˜+ (p) ,
which would give D2 expected profits equal to:
π˜A2 = p(∆+ π
∗), π˜B2 = ∆+ π˜
− (p) + π˜+ (p)− pπ∗ − (1− p)πm.
The latter is likely to be higher,48 and is indeed so when p is close to 0, since then
π˜B2 = ∆ > π˜
A
2 = 0. In addition, we have:
Lemma 17 π˜B2 > π˜
A
2 when p is close to 1.
Proof. To see this, define
ψ (p) ≡ π˜B2 − π˜A2 = (1− p) (∆− πm) + π˜− (p) + π˜+ (p)− 2pπ∗,
and note that ψ (1) = 0 and:
ψ0 (p) <
d (π˜+ + π˜−)
dp
.
Furthermore, diﬀerentiating the first-order conditions (33) yields:
ρ˜+0 (1) =
ρ∗C 00(ρ∗)− (1− ρ∗)∆
(C 00(ρ∗))2 −∆2
∆,
ρ˜−0 (1) =
(1− ρ∗)C 00(ρ∗)− ρ∗∆
(C 00(ρ∗))2 −∆2
∆,
48It can for example be shown that this is always the case when C 00 (.) > 2∆.
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and thus:
d (π˜+ + π˜−)
dp
¯¯¯¯
p=1
= −(1− ρ∗)ρ∗∆− ρ∗∆ρ˜−0 (1) + (1− ρ∗)ρ∗∆− ρ∗∆ρ˜+0 (1)
= −ρ∗∆ C
00(ρ∗)−∆
(C 00(ρ∗))2 −∆2
∆
=
−ρ∗∆2
C 00(ρ∗) +∆
< 0.
The conclusion then follows, since ψ (1) = 0 and ψ0 (1) < 0 imply π˜B2 > π˜
A
2 for p
smaller than but close to 1.
Whenever π˜B2 > π˜
A
2 , UB wins the competition with a tariﬀ TB that leaves D2
indiﬀerent between accepting that or UA’s best oﬀer, namely, such that:
TB = ∆+ π˜−(p)− p(∆+ π∗) = (1− p)∆+ π˜−(p)− pπ∗.
Therefore, investing firms’ total expected discounted profits become:
πB1 = ρ1(1− ρ2)∆+ (1− ρ1)ρ2((1− p)∆+ π˜− (p)− pπ∗) + π˜+ − C(ρ1),
π2 = ρ2(1− ρ1)(p (∆+ π∗)− π˜− (p)) + π˜− (p)− C(ρ2).
The corresponding investment levels are thus characterized by the following first-order
conditions:
C 0(ρ1) = (1− (2− p) ρ2)∆− ρ2
¡
π˜− (p)− pπ∗
¢
,
C 0(ρ2) = (1− ρ1)(p (∆+ π∗)− π˜− (p)).
These investment levels converge respectively to ρ∗ when p tends to 1, and in the limit
the integrated firm’s simply obtains π∗ in each period. In contrast, when D1 merges
with UA, as long as F < Fˆ (p), their joint profit is equal to πm + πˆ+ (p), which tends
to πm + π∗ as p tends to 1. Since UA moreover obtains zero profit when remaining
independent, integrating UA is more profitable than integrating UB when p is close to
1.
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